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RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION OF LEGAL INTERESTS
IN MICHIGAN PROPERTY: I*
William F. Fratchert

I.

INTRODUCTION

the century and a half which followed the Norman Conquest, the owner of land who attempted to transfer it might
meet with opposition from three interested parties, his feudal overlord,
his heir apparent and his tenant. His feudal overlord might object to a
transfer by way of substitution, that is, one under the terms of which the
transferor did not retain a reversion; because the proposed transferee
was not a suitable person to per(orm the feudal services due for the land.
As these services were frequently of a personal or military nature such
an objection was not necessarily captious. His overlord might object
with equal reason to a transfer by way of subinfeudation, that is, one
under the terms of which the transferor did retain a reversion. Although in this case the transferor would remain personally responsible
for the feudal services due to the overlord, the value of some of the
feudal incidents of lordship might be seriously reduced. For example,
if the owner died such, the overlord, by virtue of the feudal incident
of wardship, would be entitled to possession of the land during the
minority of the heir; whereas if the owner had transferred the land by
way of subinfeudation, reserving only nominal services, such as a rose
a year at midsummer, the overlord would be entitled only to those
nominal services from the transferee during the minority of the transferor's heir. The reason why an heir apparent might object to the
alienation of his anticipated inheritance requires no elucidation. The
tenant might have cogent reasons for opposin.g a transfer which would
require him to render homage, fealty and personal or military service
to a stranger.
The extent to which the objections of the overlord, the heir and
the tenant constituted legal impediments to inter vivos alienation prior
to the year 1200 is not now known and probably was far from clear at

D

URING

"' The writer is indebted to Professor Lewis M. Simes of the University of Michigan
Law Faculty for guidance and advice in the preparation of this article. It is designed to
form part of a larger study of the validity of devices which fetter, directly or indirectly, the
free alienability of Michigan property, to be published as a book.
t Member of the Michigan Bar; Professor of Law, University of Missouri.-Ed.
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the time. 1 Early in the thirteenth century it was settled by judicial
decision that neither the heir apparent nor the tenant could effectively
prevent a transfer by the owner. If an owner in fee simple absolute
transferred the land in his lifetime without the consent of his heir
apparent, the heir could not get it back after his ancestor's death. 2
Although the acquiescence (attornment) of the tenant was necessary
to the complete effectiveness of a transfer of land, that acquiescence
could be compelled. 3 Th.e objection of the overlord was not so quickly
overruled. The 1217 edition of Magna Carta expressly recognized the
right of an overlord to object to alienation in some cases. 4 Nevertheless, there is reason to believe that by 1284 the courts recognized the
power of an owner of land to transfer it without the consent of his overlord.11 However that may be, the question was settled by the enactment
in 1290 of the Statute of Westminster III, commonly known as Quia
Emptores Terrarum. 6 This statute forbade further transfers by way of
subinfeudation and provided, "That from henceforth it shall be lawful
to every freeman to sell at his own pleasure his lands and tenements,
or part of them .... This statute extendeth but only to lands holden in
· fee simple."7
Although it may have been possible to transmit land by will in the
1 PoLLOCK AND MAITLAND, HxsToRY OF ENGLISH LAw BEFORE THE TIME oF EDWAllD
I, 310-330 (1895); 2 id. 93, 127-128, 250-253, 306-311; 3 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OP
ENGLISH LAw, 3d ed., 73-87 (1923). This doubtful state of the law is not surprising in
view of the then relatively recent imposition of a system of feudal tenures upon the earlier
Anglo-Saxon land law, which had included a variety of tenures and of local customs not
fully understood by the Normans. SCRUITON, LAND IN FE'ITllRS 1-36 (1886).
2 FitzRoger v. Arundel, Bract. N.B. pl. 1054 (1225).
a Pesehale v. Fitz Aucher, Bract. N.B. pl. 533 (1231); Cambridge v. Risle, R.S.Y.B.
34-35 Edw. I, 314 (1306). The requirement of attomment was abolished by Stat. 4 Ann.
c. 16, §9 (1705). It never existed in Michigan. Perrin v. Lepper, 34 Mich. 292 (1876).
4 "No freeman from henceforth shall give or sell any more of his land, but so that of
the residue of his lands the lord of the fee may have the service due to him, which belongeth to the fee." C. 39, BARRINGTON, MAGNA CHARTA AND OTHER GREAT CHARTERS OF
ENoLAND, 2d ed., 279 (1900). This provision was repeated in 9 Hen. ID, stat. 1, c. 32
(1225), 2 CoKE, lNsnTUTEs 65. The "Grand Chartre des Franchises" of Henry ID was
confirmed by 25 Edw. I, stat. 1, c. I (1297), 28 Edw. I, stat. 3, c. l (1300) and 42 Edw.
III, c. I (1368) but without specific mention of chapter 32. It would seem that these
confirmations of Magna Carta did not revive chapters which had been repealed or modified
by later statutes. Jenk. 2, 145 Eng. Rep. 2 (1771).
5 PLUCKNETT, LEGISLATION OF EDWARD I, 104 (1949). The Statute of Wales, 12
Edw. I, c. 10 (1284), 1 Stat. of the Realm 55, 66 (1810) prohibited specific enforcement
of covenants against alienation. This statute was a codification of the existing English
common law made for the purpose of extending it to Wales and, although not applicable
to England, is evidence of the current state of the common law.
o 18 Edw. I, stat. 1 (1290).
7 Id., caps. 1, 3; 2 CoKE, lNsnTUTEs 500, 504. Sir Edward Coke states that the word
"sell" (vendere) includes "give." Id., 501. The statute was not construed to permit alienation by tenants in chief of the Crown without royal license [3 HoLDsWoRTH, HISTORY OF
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Anglo-Saxon and early Norman periods, it became settled in the twelfth
century that a devise of a legal freehold estate in land was ineffective
as against the heir of the testator. 8 Early in the thirteenth century the
device of conveying legal title to others to hold to the use of the transferor or those whom he might name was developed. 9 The rights of the
beneficiary of a conveyances to uses; who Wl}S known as a cestui que
use, were not initially enforceable in any tribunal and the common law
courts never did enforce them, but from the end of the fourteenth
century they were enforceable in equity.10 Such rights were conceived
of as being more in the nature of a chose in action than a property
interest and choses in action were not assignable.11 Nevertheless the
interest of the cestui que use was always alienable inter vivos and a
statute of 1483 empowered him to convey the legal title without the
consent of the legal owner.12 The interest of the cestui que use was
transmissible by will and one of the chief purposes of the use device
was to avoid the rule that legal freehold estates in land could not be
devised.13 This possibility was cut off in 1535 by the Statute of Uses,
which converted the interest of the beneficiary into a legal estate.14
ENGLISH LAw, 3d ed., 81, 83-84 (1923)] but this exception was narrowed by statutes
providing that lands once held under a subordinate overlord should not be treated as being
held in chief of the Crown by reason of the king's acquiring the overlord's estate by escheat,
attainder, dissolution or surrender. 9 Hen. III, stat. 1, c. 31 (1225); 1 Edw. III, stat. 2,
c. 13 (1327); 1 Edw. VI, c. 4 (1547). Moreover, a transfer by a tenant in chief without
royal license was not void but merely entitled the king to a reasonable fine. 17 Edw. II,
stat. 1, c. 7 (1324); 1 Edw. III, stat. 2, c. 12 (1327). Such fines for alienation of land held
of the Crown in chief were abolished by stat. 12 Car. II, c. 24, §1 (1660).
s 2 PoLLOCK AND MArn.AND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw BEFORE THB TIMB OF EDWARD I, 312-328 (1895). There were exceptions to this rule as to land in towns. Id., 330.
9Quency v. Prior of Barnwell, Bract., N.B., pl. 999 (1224).
10 Godwyn v. Profyt, Sel. Cases in Chancery (S.S.) 48 (1396-1399); Ames, "Origin
of Uses and Trusts,'' 21 HARv. L. RBv. 261 at 262, 274 (1908); Brown, "Ecclesiastical
Origin of the Use,'' 10 NOTRE DAME LAWYBR 353 at 361-366 (1935).
11 Ames, "The Inalienability of Choses in Action," LECTtJRES ON LEGAL HISTORY
210-218 (1913).
12 Stat. 1 Ric. III, c. 1 (1483); BAcoN, READING UFoN THB STATUTE OF UsBs 16
(1642); CnmsE, EssAY ON UsEs §36 (1795); GILBERT, LAw OF UsBs AND TRUSTS, 2d
ed., 26 (1741); HoLMEs, COMMON LAw 408 (1881); SANDERS, EssAY ON UsEs AND
TRUSTS, 4th ed., 65 (1823).
1s Stat. 4 Hen. VII, c. 4 (1487); 7 Hen. VII, c. 3 (1490); 3 Hen. VIII, c. 4 (1511);
SOLI.IVAN, HISTORICAL TREATISE ON THE FEUDAL LAW 166-167 (1772); JENKS, SHORT
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw, new ed., 104 (1934); MArn.AND, EQmTY, 2d ed., 25-26
(1936).
14 Stat. 27 Hen. VIII, c. 10 (1535). This statute is entitled, "An Act concerning
Uses and Wills,'' and its preamble recites as its primary purpose the abolition of wills of
land. It may be that this effect of the Statute of Uses could be avoided by making a
feoffment to such uses as the feoffer might by will appoint. See Sir Edward Clere's Case,
6 Co. Rep. 17b, 77 Eng. Rep. 279 (1599).

678

MrcHIGAN LAW REvmw

[ Vol. 50

Five years later the power to transmit legal freehold estates by will was
conferred by statute.15
The Statute of Uses had no application to property interests other
than freehold estates in land and within a century after its enactment
the High Court of Chancery created two important exceptions to its
applicability to freehold interests in land. The uses excepted from the
operation of the statute were the use created by a conveyance which
imposed active duties upon the conveyee16 and the use, on a use. 17 In
these cases and in the case of a conveyance to uses of something other
than a freehold interest in land, the transaction was enforced in equity
as a trust. The early decisions treated the interest of the beneficiary of
a trust as a chose in action which could be transmitted by will but was
not transferable inter vivos. 18 Before long, however, the property analogy prevailed and a cestui que trust could transfer his interest inter
vivos as freely as he could an equivalent legal estate.19
The transferability of estates for life seems to have been conceded
without serious opposition in the mediaeval period. 20 Such a transfer
did not affect the overlord's feudal incident of wardship or injure the
transferor's heir. Estates for years were treated as chattel interests and
regarded as freely alie:qable, both by assignment inter vivos21 and by
will. 22 The law of England has always recognized the alienability of
chattels personal, both inter vivos 23 and by will. 24
15 Statute of Wills, 32 Hen. VIII, c. 1 (1540). The explanatory statute of 34 & 35
Hen. VIII, c. 5 (1542) limited the operation of the Statute of Wills to estates in fee simple,
thus excluding estates in fee tail and estates pur autre vie. The latter were made devisable
by Stat. 29 Car. II, c. 3, §12 (1676). The Statute of Wills restricted the devisability of
land held by knight-service. This form of tenure was abolished and land formerly so held
made freely devisable by Stat. 12 Car. II, c. 24, §1 (1660). See 1 CoKB, lNsnTUTEs
lllb (Hargrave's note No. 138 to 13th ed., 1787). The restriction on devisability of land
held by knight-service could be avoided by making a feoffment to such uses as the feoffer
might by will appoint. Sir Edward Clere's Case, note 14 supra.
16 Anonymous, Brook's New Cases 94, 73 Eng. Rep. 888 (1544); Nevil v. Saunders,
1 Vern. 415, 23 Eng. Rep. 555 (1686).
17Tyrrel's Case, 2 Dyer 155a, 73 Eng. Rep. 336 (1557) (co=on law decision that
use •on a use is not executed); Sambach v. Dalston, Tothill 188, 21 Eng. Rep. 164 (1634)
(Chancery decision that use on a use is enforceable in equity); Ames, "Origin of Uses and
Trusts," 21 HARv. L. REv. 261 at 270-274 (1908).
18 Anonymous, 3 Dyer 369a, 73 Eng. Rep. 827, Jenk. 245, 145 Eng. Rep. 172 (1580);
Earl of Worcester v. Finch, 4 CoKE, lNsTlTUTES 85, 2 Anderson 162, 123 Eng. Rep. 600
(1600); HOLMES, COMMON LAW 409 (1881).
19 Warmstrey v. Lady Tanfield, 1 Ch. R. 29, 21 Eng. Rep. 498 (1628).
20 LITTLETON, TENURllS §301 (1481); 3 Hor.nswoRTH, H:rsTORY OF ENGUSH LAw,
3d ed., 123 (1923).
21 Fitz Henry v. Utdeners, Bract. N.B. 804 (1233); LITTLETON, TENURllS §319
(1481).
22 2 PoLLOCK & MAITLAND, HISTORY oF ENGusH LAw BEFORll THE TIME OF EnWARD I, 115-117 (1895); 3 HoLnswoRTH, HISTORY OF ENGUSH LAW, 3d ed., 215 (1923).
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It thus appears that by the time English law was carried to this
country in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries it recognized that,
in the absence of special restrictions on alienability imposed by the
creator of the interest or by its owner, property interests, real and personal, were transferable by their owner, either inter vivas or by will.
As to estates in fee simple the incident ·of alienability was expressly
conferred by the statute Quia Emptores Terrarum. 25 From an early
period English law had permitted access by judgment creditors to property which the debtor had power to transfer voluntarily.26 There then
were and still are a number of restrictions imposed by law upon the
free alienability of property. Nevertheless, by the law of England,
property interests are, in general, alienable. The question for inquiry
is, to what extent will the law recognize and enforce special restrictions
on alienability, imposed by the creator of the interest or its owner, on
property interests which, in the absence of such special restrictions,
would be alienable? Such a restriction may assume the form of a prohibition on alienation, the effect of which would be, if enforced, to
leave the owner still owner despite an attempt on his part to transfer
his interest. It may assume the form of a provision that the interest
shall revert to its creator or pass to a third party if the owner attempts
to transfer it. Or it may provide for some other penalty to be suffered
by the owner or his transferee in the event of a transfer.
This article is limited to restraints on alienation of legal, as distinguished from equitable, interests in land. The creation of a trust usually imposes restraints upon the alienation of the trustee's legal estate
and may restrain alienation by the cestui que trust of his equitable
estate. Such restraints are not within the scope of this article.
The present inquiry does not extend to the validity of provisions
which do not directly nullify or penalize a transfer of property but
which have the effect of making alienation impossible, difficult or improbable. The creation of property interests in unborn or unascertained persons has the effect of making them inalienable because there
is no owner to alienate. 27 The creation of a type of interest as to which
Cochrane v. Moore, 25 Q.B.D. 57 (Ct. App. 1890).
Anonymous, S.S.Y.B. 1 & 2 Edw. II, 39, 42 (1308); 2 POLLOCK & MArrr.ANI>, HrsTORY oF ENcusH LAw BEFORE THE T1111E oF EnwARD I, 353 (1895); 3 HoLnswoRTH,
HISTORY OF ENGUSH LAw, 3d ed., 552-553 (1923).
23
24

18 Edw. I, stat. 1, c. 1 (1290); note 7 supra.
13 Edw. I, stat. 1, c. 18 (1285); Amby v. Gower, 1 Ch. Rep. 168, 21 Eng. Rep.
540 (1655); 1 CoKE, lNSTITUTEs 191a (Butler's note No. 77, VI 9, to 13th ed. 1787).
27 As to the possibility of creating such interests, see Pratcher, ''Truster as Sole Trustee
and Only Ascertainable Beneficiary," 47 M1cH. L. REv. 907-934 (1949).
25
20
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the law imposes restrictions on alienation has the effect of restraining
its alienation although the creator of the interest may not wish this
result. For example, a conveyance of land to a husband and wife
creates a tenancy by the entirety which neither tenant, acting alone,
can alienate, wholly or in part. 28 Even though a property interest is
legally transferable its sale may be commercially impracticable if it does
not entitle the owner to exclusive enjoyment of the land or goods concerned, if enjoyment is burdened with onerous servitudes, or if enjoyment is uncertain as to coming _into existence or duration. Property
subject to co-tenancy, easements, profits or use restrictions may be very
hard to sell because of such burdens. A present interest which is
subject to being defeated by the happening of an event which is not
certain to occur or uncertain as to time of occurrence is likely to be unsalable. A future interest which may never become possessory unless an
uncertain event occurs is almost certain to be unmarketable. There is
little commercial demand for future interests, even those which are
certain to become possessory, particularly if the date when enjoyment
is to commence is uncertain. The law recognizes the social undesirability of too great extension of these indirect restraints upon alienation
and upon free commerce in property and sets limits to them in various
ways. The Rule Against Perpetuities, for example, restricts the creation of contingent future interests. The present inquiry, however,
does not extend to such indirect restraints upon alienation except
where an interest is made conditional upon or subject to defeasance by
alienation or the creator or owner of an interest which is by its nature
affected by an indirect restraint attempts to impose an additional restriction designed to nullify or penalize such alienation as would otherwise be legally possible.
Michigan's Acceptance of English Law
The direction and scope of the present inquiry have been defined,
but discussion of the Michigan decisions relative to direct restraints
on alienation must be deferred to a preliminary inquiry into the extent to which the law of England has been adopted as the rule of decision in Michigan.29 Until its cession to Great Britain by the Treaty
of Paris of 1763 the area which now composes the State of Michigan
2s Naylor v. Minock, 96 Mich. 182, 55 N.W. 664 (1893).
29 By permission of the University of Detroit, holder of the copyright, some of the
discussion which follows is taken from the writer's article, "Fees Tail in Michigan," 4 UNIV.
DETROIT L.J. 19 at 22-27 (1940).
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was subject to the laws of France and of the French colonial government. By the law of England the settlement of uninhabited territory by English colonists extends to that territory the common law and
statutes of England then in force, but English law does not extend
to conquered territory unless and until so extended by the king. so As
Michigan became British by conquest rather than by settlement, the
problem of whether English law is in force here is, therefore, different
from that in the seaboard states.
The British Government was very slow in extending its administration to the area, no definite provision being made until it was incorporated into the Province of Quebec by the Quebec Act of 1774,
which provided that the law of Canada, that is, the French law, should
be the rule of decision in matters of property and civil rights. 31 In
1791 the old Province of Quebec was divided into Upper Canada and
Lower Canada, the former embracing the territory which now composes Michigan and Ontario.32 In the following year the legislature
of Upper Canada repealed the Quebec Act insofar as it made the law
of Canada the rule of decision and provided: "That from and after
the passing of this Act, in all matters of controversy relative to property
and civil rights, resort shall be had to the Laws of England, as the rule
for the decision of the same."33
On July 14, 1795 the Governor and Judges of the Territory of the
United States Northwest of the River Ohio adopted a law reading as
follows:
"The common law of England, all statutes or Acts of the British
parliament in aid of the common law, prior to the fourth year of
the reign of King James the first (and which are of a general
nature, not local to that kingdom) and also the several laws in
force in this Territory, shall be the rule of decision, and shall be
considered as of full force, until repeal!:!d by legislative authority,
or disapproved of by Congress."34
It has been suggested that this law of the Northwest Territory is
so Calvin's Cases, 7 Co. Rep. la, 17b, 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 398, and Fraser's note k
(1608); Blankard v. Galdy, 4 Mod. 215, 87 Eng. Rep. 356, 2 Salk. 411, 91 Eng. Rep. 356
(1693); Sioussat, "The Theory of the Extension of English Statutes to the Plantations,"
I SELECT EssAYS IN ANcLo-AMEmCAN LEGAL Hi:sTORY 416-430 (1907). The present
writer has discussed the vexed question of the application to colonial possessions of British
statutes enacted after the settlement or conquest of the colony in an unpublished magisterial thesis entitled, A CoMMENTARY :FOR CANADA ON THE STAl'tl'I'E o:F WESTMINSTER,
1931, pp. 118-123 (1938), copies of which are deposited in the library of Wayne University.
s1 Stat. 14 Geo. ill, c. 83, §§1, 18. Great Britain was in actual control of Michigan
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the basis upon which the law of England, as altered by local statutes,
is applied in Michigan,35 but this is probably inaccurate, for Michigan was not annexed to the Northwest Territory until July 15, 1796,
and a mere cession of territory from one sovereign to another does not
of itself alter the law of the land.36 The statute of Upper Canada
would seem to be in force in Michigan, however, except insofar as
repealed or modi:6ed by local statutes.37
On September 16, 1810 the Governor and Judges of Michigan
Territory adopted an act providing that no act of the parliament of
England, no act of the parliament of Great Britain, no law of France
or the French provinces of Canada or Louisiana, no law of Canada
generally or of the province of Upper Canada under the British Crown,
and no law of the Northwest Territory or Indiana Territory should have
any force in Michigan.38 The legislative authority of the Governor and
Judges was limited to the adoption of "laws of the original states."39
In token of conformity to this limitation the act of September 16, 1810,
recites that the part of it relative to British statutes and laws of the
Northwest and Indiana territories is taken from the law of Virginia, and
that relative to French and Canadian law from the law of Vermont. The
writer has been unable to find any Virginia statute repealing the laws
of the Northwest Territory or Indiana Territory or any Vermont statute
repealing the laws of Upper Canada. In consequence, the validity
from November 29, 1760 to July 11, 1796, despite the provisions of the treaties of 1783
and 1794. 1 BURTON, C1TY oF DETROIT 114, 154 (1922); RIDDELL, M:rcmcAN UNDER
BRITISH RuLB: LAw AND LAw CoURTs 1760-1796, 21-26 (1926); RussBLL, THE BRITISH
RllmMll IN M:rcmcAN AND THE OLD NoRTHWllST 1760-1796, 16, 270n (1939).
32 Canada Act, 31 Geo. ill, c. 31 (1791).
33 Stat. 32 Geo. ill (Upper Canada), c. 1, §3 (1792).
34Laws of the Territory of the United States North-West of the Ohio, 175, 176
(1796). As to the validity of this law see 1 Trans. Sup. Ct. Terr. Mich., 1805-1814, xiv,
xv. The similar law of Indiana Territory (Act Sept. 17, 1807, Laws of Indiana Territory,
p. 323) was never effective in Michigan because Michigan was part of Indiana Territory
only from July 4, 1800 to June 30, 1805.
35 May v. Rumney, 1 Mich. 1, 4 (1847).
36 Laws of the Territory of Michigan, x (1871).
37Jn Denison v. Tucker, 1 Trans. Sup. Ct. Terr. Mich. 1805-1814, 385 (1807),
Chief Judge Woodward of the Territorial Supreme Court held that a statute of Upper
Canada authorizing slavery ceased to operate in July 1796, but on the ground it was superseded by the anti-slavery provisions of the Ordinance of 1787.
38 I Laws Terr. Mich. 210, 900 (1871). This act was expressly excepted from the
act of the Legislative Council of April 13, 1827 which repealed most of the early territorial legislation. 3 id., 602, 603. Since Michigan has become a state there have been only
two attempts to revise and reenact completely all the statutory law, Rev. Stat. 1838 and
1846. Neither revision appears to repeal the 1810 act.
39Ordinance of 1787, §5, 1 Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) 53; act Jan. 11, 1805, 2 Stat.
309, 1 Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) 58.
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of the act of September 16, 1810, would seem to be dubious. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of Michigan has held that it was effective
to repeal English statutes of Henry VIII, Elizabeth and Charles II. 40
In a case decided in 1845 counsel contended that the common law
was repealed by the Schedule to the Constitution of 1835 or by the
Revised Statutes of 1838. This contention was rejected by the Supreme Court, which held that the common law is in force in Michigan. 41 Assuming the soundness of this decision and of those holding that the act of September 16, 1810, repealed the Tudor and Stuart
statutes, are the statutes of the Plantagenet kings in force in Michigan?
In his astonishing opinion in Grant v. Earl of Selkirk42 Judge Woodward stated that the common law ''became complete, and insusceptible
of any additions" upon the coronation of Richard the Lion-Hearted,
September 3, ll89.43 Such a view would restore trial by ordeal and
wager of battle; it would deny that even Magna Carta and the English
case law of the thirteenth through sixteenth centuries are part of the
common law and would confine that term to a primitive system which
is virtually unknown and certainly unsuited to a modem community.
40 Grant v. Earl of Selkirk, 1 Trans. Sup. Ct. Terr. Mich. 1814-1824, 431 (1818)
(Lord's Day Act, 29 Car. II, c. 7, 1676. The court held, however, that the statute was
merely declaratory of the common law, which is in force in Michigan); Bruckner's Lessee
v. Lawrence, 1 Doug. 19 (Mich. 1843) (Stat. 32 Hen. VIII, c. 9, 1540); Trask v. Green,
9 Mich. 358 (1861) (Statute of Uses, 27 Hen. VIII, c. 10, 1535); Methodist Episcopal
Church of Newark v. Clark, 41 Mich. 730, 3 N.W. 207 (1879) (Statute of Charitable
Uses, 43 Eliz., c. 4, 1601.) In this case the court did not recognize that the Statute of
Charitable Uses was declaratory of the common law despite the convincing evidence to that
effect presented by Horace Binney in Vidal v. Girard's Executors, 2 How. (43 U.S.) 127
(1844). There are dicta by Justice Christiancy in Trask v. Green, 9 Mich. 358 at 365
(1861) and Chief Justice Campbell in In the Matter of Lamphere, 61 Mich. 105 at 108,
27 N.W. 882 (1886), suggesting that the English statutes were never effective in Michigan but they are clearly erroneous. In his dissenting opinion in Dolby v. State Highway
Commissioner, 283 Mich. 609, 278 N.W. 694 (1938), at pp. 625-627, Justice Potter
expressed the view that the Act of 1810 was void and that the English statutes have been
since 1796 and still are a part of the law of Michigan.
41 Stout v. Keyes, 2 Doug. 184 (Mich. 1845). Accord: Lorman v. Benson, 8 Mich.
18 (1860); Reynolds v. McMullen, 55 Mich. 568, 22 N.W. 41 (1885). A better argument
would have been that, as it was the Upper Canada Act of 1792 (note 33 supra) which
extended the common law to this area, the repeal of that act in 1810 repealed the common
law. The schedules to the Constitutions of 1850 and 1908 provide that the common law
shall remain in force until altered or repealed. 1 Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) pp. 105 and
151.
42 I Trans. Sup. Ct. Terr. Mich. 431 (1818).
43 Id. at 436. In fairness to Judge Woodward it should be noted that he did use Eng·
lish cases decided after 1189 as precedents, probably upon the theory that, although the com•
men law remains complete, static and unchangeable, judges find or declare it from time to
time as occasion requires. No doubt the modern concept, necessitated by the research of legal
historians, of the common law as a constantly growing and developing system, moulded by
the judges to fit new conditions, would have been anathema to Judge Woodward.
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Sir Matthew Hale thought that the statutes enacted prior to 1327 or
1336 should be treated as part of the common law44 and even a most
conservative view would include later non-statutory judicial developments, at least through the period of the Year Books. Although there
is reason to believe that parts of the two Plantagenet statutes which are
most significant in the law of restraints on alienation, De Donis Conditionalibus45 and Quia Emptores Terrarum, 46 declared pre-existing common law,47 the view that thirteenth and fourteenth century statutes
were mere custumals, solely declaratory of the common law and effect, ing no change in it whatever, has been effectively refuted. 48
The English polity of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries knew
no clear differentiation among executive, legislative and judicial functions. The king in his council, of which the royal judges were important members, was chief executive, supreme legislator and chief
judge. His formal enactments, orders in council, written and oral
instructions to judges about to go on circuit, and decisions of litigated
cases were alike sources of law. The judges had administrative as well
as judicial functions and their pronouncements were sometimes legislative, sometimes administrative, sometimes judicial and sometimes all
three. In later centuries, when Parliament, the Council and the courts
had become sharply distinct, compilers chose to print some of the
early royal charters, proclamations and orders with the acts of Parliament. Many, perhaps most, of the rules which were not so printed
had origins which were equally as legislative as those which were
printed. 49 The law of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries cannot
be divided into statute law and common law as can that of later eras.
Any attempt to adopt the common law of those centuries and reject the
statutes produces disconnected fragments of what was a unified legal
system, selected according to arbitrary modern standards which would
be unintelligible to contemporary lawyers. We must adopt Plantagenet law as a whole or reject it entirely.
44HALE, HzsTORY oF THE CoMMoN LAw OF ENGLAND, 3d ed., 7-9 (1739).
45 13 Edw. I, stat. 1, c. l (1285).
46 18 Edw. I, stat. l (1290).
47 PLUCKNETT, LEGISLATION oF EnwARD I, 104 (1949); PLuCKNl!TT, STATUTES AND
THEIR lm-ERPRETATION IN THE FmsT HALF oF THE FounTEENTH CENTURY IO, 130-131
(1922).
48 Id., 26-31; Venour v. Blund, S.S.Y.B. 3 & 4 Edw. II, 159, 162 (1310).
49 PLUCKNETT, STATUTES AND THEIR !m-ERPRETATION IN THE FmsT HALF OF THE
FounTEENTH CENTURY 1-2, 7-11, 20-25 (1922); 1 POLLOCK AND MArn.AND, HzsTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I, 159-160 (1895).
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To Americans generally, the English common law is the general
system of jurisprudence, including statutes and their judicial interpretation, expounded in the Institutes of Sir Edward Coke. The usual
view, exemplified by the law of the Northwest Territory of 1795/ 0
that the law of England, statutory and otherwise, as it was at the time
of the settlement of Virginia in 1607, is in force in this country5 1 is
consistent with this concept. It provides a complete and integrated
system of law upon which American courts and legislatures may engraft such changes and additions as our social conditions and development require. The unfortunate territorial law of September 16, 1810,
and the decisions that the statutes of the Tudors and Stuarts were repealed by it:5 2 prevent Michigan from being fully in accord with the
general American view. They do not prevent a decision that the Plantagenet statutes are part of that common law which is declared to be in
force by the Schedule to the Constitution of Michigan. 153

II. THE

ENTAIL

Incident to his daughter's marriage the mediaeval man of property
commonly gave land to his new son-in-law to facilitate support of the
daughter and the children of the marriage. The donor in such cases,
understandably, desired to restrict the gift so that the land would be
certain to go to the children of the marriage rather than to the son-inlaw's children by some other wife, that it would not be lost by the improvidence of the son-in-law, and that it would return to the donor
if there were no children of the marriage or if the issue of the marriage
failed. The device used for this purpose from very early times, probably before the Norman Conquest, was the maritagium, a gift under
the terms of which the land could descend only to issue of the marriage, the immediate donee. The children of the marriage and the grandchildren of the marriage were forbidden to alienate in fee and the land
returned to the donor if there was no issue of the marriage or if the
issue of the marriage failed before a great-grandchild inherited. If
Note 34 supra.
1 KENT, CoMMENTARIES ON AMEmcAN LAW, 11th ed., 515-516, notes (a), (b)
(1867); 1 BLAcKsTONB, CoMMENTARIEs, (Cooley's 2d ed.) 67, Cooley's note (3) (1872).
52 Note 40 supra.
53 Note 41 supra. In his great opinion in Mandlebaum v. McDonell, 29 Mich. 78 at
95 (1874), Justice Christiancy suggested that, whether or not the statute Qiiia Emptores
T erramm is in force as such here, its principles have always been basic in the law of the
western states.
50

51
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a great-grandchild of the marriage did succeed to the title, he and his
heirs owned the land in fee simple absolute. 54
There were other situations, notably gifts to younger sons, in which
restrictions upon inheritance and alienation and provisions for reversion to the donor seemed desirable, particularly after the courts decided, early in the thirteenth century, that an owner in fee simple
could transfer his estate without the consent of his heir apparent. 55
These restrictions were commonly imposed by making the gift to the
donee and the heirs of his body, to him and the heirs male of his body,
or to him and the heirs of his body by a particular wife. Initially such
gifts seem to have been construed and enforced similarly to the maritagium but about the middle of the thirteenth century the courts, probably due to the influence of Roman law, held that all such gifts, including the maritagium, were in fee simple conditional. That is, they
construed a gift to "B and the heirs of his body" to mean "to B in fee
simple on condition that he have heirs of his body." Under this tortured construction, the donee of a conditional fee could transfer a fee
simple absolute, cutting off both the reversion of the donor and the
expectancy of his heirs, as soon as issue of the specified class was born. 56
This judicial legislation enabled a donee to thwart the reasonable desire of a parent who made a gift incident to the marriage of a son or
daughter that the land should revert to him if there were no children
of the marriage and that it should pass to the children of the marriage
if any there were. In modern law this desire can be effectuated by a
conveyance to the donee for life, with remainder in fee to his children,
which makes the children take by purchase instead of by descent.
Although future interests by way of remainder were not unknown
in the· thirteenth century,57 the law governing them was in a very
imperfect state of development. It is probable that conveyancers of
that century anticipated the rules which became established in the
54 PLUCKNE'IT, LEGISLATION OP EDWARD I, 125-127 (1949). Strictly speaking, the
entailment lasted until there had been three descents. H a son died before his father, the
descent to the grandson would be only one. In such cases the restraint on alienation might
extend beyond grandchildren. There were other forms of maritagium. The gift might be
to the daughter or to the daughter and son-in-law jointly. When the terms exempted the
estate conveyed from feudal services during the period of inalienability the transaction was
known as a gift in frank marriage.
55Jd. at 127-128; 3 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw, 3d ed., 111-113 (1923);
PRoPERTY RESTATEMENT, Introductory Note to Div. IV, Pt. I (1944).
56 Brian v. London, R.S.Y.B. 32-3 Edw. I, 279 (1304). An alienation by the donee
before birth of issue barred the issue but not the donor's reversion. l CoKE, INSTITUTES
19a. Note 29 supra applies to the discussion which follows.
57 3 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw, 3d ed., 104 (1923).
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next century that remainders limited to unborn persons were contingent
and that contingent remainders were invalid.68 Accordingly, the enactment of a statute seemed to be the only effective way of making it
possible for a donor to make sure that he would get the land back if
there were no children of the marriage to which the gift was incident
and that they would get it if there were.
Chapter I of the Statute of Westminster Il,59 known as De Donis
Conditionalibus, recited the recent judicial construction which defeated
the intent of the donor of a maritagium or other fee simple conditional,
and provided:
"Wherefore our lord the king, perceiving how necessary and
expedient it should be to provide remedy in the aforesaid cases,
hath ordained, that the will of the giver, according to the form in
the deed of gift manifestly expressed, shall be from henceforth
observed; so that they to whom the land was given under such
condition, shall have no power to aliene the land so given, but
that it shall remain unto the issue of them to whom it was given
after their death, or shall revert unto the giver, or his heirs, if issue
fail ( whereas there is no issue at all) or if any issue be, and fail by
death, -0r heir of the body of such issue failing."
The statute provided remedies to enforce the donor's reversion
when issue of the donee failed and to protect the issue's right to the
land when the donee had alienated and died. The courts soon devised
a similar remedy to enforce a remainder limited after the gift to the
donee and the heirs of his body.60 The effect of the statute, as applied
by the courts, was to give the donee a new type of estate of inheritance,
the fee tail, which, unlike the pre-statutory conditional fee, was not a
fee simple but a lesser estate carved out of the fee simple. After the
creation of an estate tail, what was left of the fee simple remained in
58 Id. at 134-136. Even after the validity of contingent remainders was established in
the fifteenth century, they would not have served the purpose at hand because, under the
rules in Shelley's Case, 1 Co. Rep. 93b, 104a, 76 Eng. Rep. 206, 234 (1581), and Wild's
Case, 6 Co. Rep. 16b, 77 Eng. Rep. 277 (1599), attempts to limit remainders to the heirs
of the life tenant or the heirs of the donor gave interest by descent, not by purchase, and
even a valid contingent remainder was destroyed by the life tenant's conveyance in fee.
Biggot v. Smyth, Cro. Car. 102, 79 Eng. Rep. 691 (1628). It is scarcely necessary to point
out that the trust to preserve contingent remainders was not invented until the seventeenth
century. See Pratcher, ''Trustor as Sole Trustee and Only Ascertainable Beneficiary," 47
MICH. L. REv. 907-918 (1949).
69 13 Edw. I, stat. 1, c. 1 (1285).
6 Fitzwilliam v. Anonymous, R.S.Y.B. 33-35 Edw. I, 20 (1305); Anonymous, S.S.Y.B.
1 & 2 Edw. II, 166 (1308-09).
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the donor by way of reversion or passed to another by way of remainder. 61 In consequence the statute Quia Emptores Terrarum, 62
enacted :five years after De Donis Conditionalihus, being limited to
estates in fee simple, had no application to estates tail as such, although
it did apply to the reversion or remainder in fee simple following an
estate tail. In inter vivos conveyances the words "heirs" and "body"
were both required for the creation of an estate tail; such words as seed,
issue and the like being insufficient as substitutes for "heirs" although
some substitutes for "body" were allowed. In the construction of
devises, however, much latitude was allowed, the only requirement
being a sufficient expression of an intention to entail.63
De Donis Conditionalihus clearly restrained alienation by the immediate donee in tail but it was not clear as to whether it restrained alienation by his issue. The word "issue" in the statute may have referred
only to the children or immediate heirs of the donee in tail or it may
have meant lineal descendants forever. There is respectable authority
for the view that the statute was not designed to revive_ the restrictions
of the ancient maritagium or to permit perpetual entails but was only
intended to make it possible to give a life estate to the immediate donee
with an unbarrable remainder in fee simple to his heir:64 However
that may be, it was decided in 1312 that the son of the donee in tail
could not alienate, with a suggestion that the restraint extended, as
in the ancient maritagium, to the grandson of the donee, 65 and in 1330
it was settled that the restraint on alienation was perpetual, binding
the heirs of the donee in tail forever. 66 So by 1330 the courts, by
construction or extension of the statute De Donis Conditionalihus,
had made possible the creation of perpetual, unbarrable entails. If
they had been permitted to continue, all of the land in England might
have become inalienable and the withdrawal of land from commerce
CoKE, lNsTITUTlls 18b-19b, 327a.
Or Westminster III, 18 Edw. I, stat. 1, notes 6 and 7 supra.
63 1 CoKE, lNsTITUTlls 9b, 20a-20b, 27a-27b. For the varieties and incidents of estates
tail see id., 18b-28b, and 2 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES "'113-"'119.
64 Bolland, Introduction to S.S.Y.B. 5 Edw. II, xxv-xxix (1915); 3 HOLDSWORTH,
HrsTORY OF ENGLISH LAw, 3d ed., 114 (1923); PLucKNETT, STATUTES AND THEll\ lNTERPRBTATION IN THB FmsT HALF oF THB FouRTllENTH CENTURY, 51-52 (1922); PLucxNETT, LEGISLATION OF EDWARD I, 131-135 (1949). But see Updegraff, "The Interpretation of 'Issue' in the Statute De Donis," 39 HARV. L. REv. 200-220 (1925).
65 Belyng v. Anonymous, S.S.Y.B. 5 Edw. II, 176, 177 (XI Y.B. Ser.), 5 Edw. II,
225, 226 (XII Y.B. Ser.) (1312).
66 Bastard v. Somer, Y.B. 4 Edw. III, Trin., pl. 4 (1330); 3 HoLDSWORTH, HISTORY
OF ENGLISH LAw, 3d ed., 115-116 (1923).
611
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would probably have hampered seriously English commercial and industrial preeminence in later centuries.
Unbarrable entails lasted for a little less than two centuries after
the enactment of the statute De Donis Conditionalibus. By 1472 the
courts had decided that a tenant in tail in possession could bar both
his heirs and the reversioner or remainderman by suffering a common
recovery, a :fictitious suit brought by one who was feigned to have a
title superior to that of the tenant in tail. 67 Within a few years statutes
of Henry VII and his son empowered the tenant in tail to levy a fine
which would bar the heirs in tail but not the reversioner or remainderman. 68 A statute of 1540 empowered the tenant in tail in possession
to bind the heirs in tail and the reversioner or remainderman by leases
for terms not in excess of three lives or twenty-one years reserving substantial rent. 69
When the law of trusts were developed in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries it was assumed that a trust or equitable estate could
be entailed as well as a legal estate. In such case it was settled that a
cestui que trust in tail who was in possession could bar the equitable
entail and the equitable reversion or remainder by suffering a common
67 Taltarum's Case, Y.B. 12 Edw. IV, Mich. pl., 25 (1472). This case was decided
the year after the short-lived restoration of Henry VI. At that time English law, unlike the
Scots, did not permit forfeiture of entailed estates for treason. There is a tradition that the
decision in Taltarum's Case was really a piece of royal legislation, dictated by Edward IV
with a view to minimizing the amount of land which was exempt from forfeiture. PxcO'rl',
CoMMON R:ecoVERIES 8-9 (I 739). See note 72 infra. It was not wholly certain that a
common recovery barred the reversion or remainder until the decision in Capel's Case, l
Co. Rep. 61b, 76 Eng. Rep. 134 (1593). Stat. 34 & 35 Hen. VIII, c. 20, §2 (1542)
nullified common recoveries where the king was reversioner or remainderman. Stat. 14 Eliz.,
c. 8, §2 (1572) made recoveries by a tenant in tail after possibility of issue extinct ineffective against the reversioner or remainderman. ·
68 Stat. 4 Hen. VII, c. 24 (1487), as explained by Stat. 32 Hen. VIII, c. 36 (1540).
The statute excepts estates tail created by the king while the reversion remains in the king.
Statutory permission was necessary because De Donis Conditionalibus had provided that
a fine levied to bar an estate tail should be void both as to the heirs and as to the reversioner. Stat. 13 Edw. I, stat. l, c. 1, §4 (1285), restated, Stat. l Ric. III, c. 7, §5 (1483).
The fine, which was another type of collusive judicial proceeding, was used when the tenant in tail was himself the reversioner or remainderman or was conveying to the reversioner
or remainderman and when the tenant in tail was such in reversion or remainder as, prior
to Stat. 14 Geo. II, c. 20, §1 (1741), only a tenant in tail in possession could suffer a
common recovery. l CoKB, lNsnTUTEs 121a (Hargrave's Note No. 172 to 13th ed., 1787).
It should be noted that the issue in tail could also be barred in some situations, without
common recovery or statutory fine, by the operation of the highly technical rules of warranty. As this operation was frequently dependent upon the ocurrence of events which
could not be foreseen at the time of the conveyance, these rules cannot have contributed
a great deal to the alienability of entailed land. Id., 37la-377a, 39lb-393b. Bordwell,
"Alienability and Perpetuities," 24 IowA L. R:ev. l at 44-50 (1938).
69 32 Hen. VIII, c. 28, §§1, 2 (1540), continued in force by Stat. 34 & 35 Hen. VIII,
c. 20, §4 (1542).
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recovery70 and that a cestui que trust in tail could bar his issue by levying a .fine as fully as if he had the legal estate. 71 Thus by the end of
the sixteenth century a tenant in tail, although restricted to special
forms of conveyance, was able to transfer inter vivos a fee simple or
any lesser estate. The inheritance could not, however, be reached by
his creditors72 and its descent according to the limitations of the entail
could not be affected by will.73
As has been seen, restraints on alienation assume two general forms,
the prohibition, which, if effective, would compel the owner of a property interest to keep it despite his attempts to transfer, and the imposition of a penalty, usually forfeiture of the interest, upon alienation.
Insofar as it is a restraint upon alienation, entailment is essentially of
the prohibitory type. The case law of the fifteenth century and the
statutes of the fifteenth and sixteenth made the prohibition on alienation implicit in entailment completely ineffective as to transfers by way
of common recovery, fine levied under the statutes of Henry VII and
his successor, and leases for periods not exceeding three lives or twentyone years. The peculiar mediaeval rules of seisin also made the prohibition partially ineffective as against the more ordinary modes of
conveyance. If a tenant in tail conveyed an estate of inheritance or
pur autre vie by feoffment, release, confirmation, or common law fine,
not levied under the statutes, his act, although tortious and not a complete bar to the issue in tail or the reversioner or remainderman, was
fully effective for the term of his life and worked a discontinuance
of the estates of the issue and the reversioner or remainderman. That
is, the right of entry which the issue or the reversioner or remainderman
would otherwise have had upon the death of the tenant in tail was
destroyed and he left with only a mere chose in action, the right to
bring an action of formedon. 74
It having been settled that entailment was largely ineffective as a
prohibition on alienation, questions soon arose as to the extent to which
a donor in tail could impose penalties on alienation.
70 North v. Way, 1 Vern. 13, 23 Eng. Rep. 270, sub nom. North v. Williams, 2 Ch.
Ca. 63, 78, 22 Eng. Rep. 848, 855 (1681).
71 Basket v. Pierce, 1 Vern. 226, 23 Eng. Rep. 431 (1683).
72 Except the king, claiming under judgment or specialty. Stat. 33 Hen. VIII, c. 39,
§75 (1541). Stat. 21 Jae. I, c. 19, §12 (1623) enabled creditors to reach estates tail
through bankruptcy proceedings. Estates tail, but not the reversion or remainder following
them, were subjected to forfeiture for treason of the tenant in tail by Stat. 26 Hen. VIII,
c. 13, §5 (1534) and 33 Hen. VIII, c. 20, §3 (1541). See DALRYMPLE, GENllRAL H1sTORY OF FEUDAL PROPERTY, 2d ed., cc. 3, 4 (1758).
73 Stat. 34 & 35 Hen. VIII, c. 5, §3 (1542).
74 1 CoKB, lNsTITUTBs 325b-327b; 1 CRmsE, DIGEST 89; Maitland, ''The Beatitude
of Seisin,'' 4 L.Q. R:sv. 24, 286, 297-298 (1888).

1952]

RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION

691

As might be expected, the decisions rendered before l 472 had held
valid conditions providing for forfeiture of an estate tail upon alienation
by the tenant in tail. This continued to be the rule, even as to alienations by way of common recovery or statutory fine, until the end of the
sixteenth century although there is evidence of growing recognition
of the fact that to hold such conditions valid as against common recoveries and statutory fines would operate to defeat these methods of
barring the entail and recreate perpetual unbarrable entails.75 The old
decisions were overruled early in the seventeeth century and it was
settled that no restraint by way of penalty, by forfeiture or otherwise,
could be imposed upon the right of a tenant in tail to bar the entail
by statutory fine or to bar both the entail and the reversion or remainder
by common recovery. 76 Whether exercise by a tenant in tail of his
statutory power to make leases for three lives or twenty-one years could
be penalized was not definitely settled. 77 A covenant by the donee
in tail not to bar the entail was not specifically enforceable78 but might
75 Anonymous, Y.B. 21 Hen. VI, Hil. pl. 21 (1443); Anonymous, Y.B. 8 Hen. VII,
Hil. pl. 3 (1493); Anonymous, Y.B. 10 Hen. VII, Mich. pl. 28 (1494); Anonymous, Y.B.
13 Hen. VII, Pasch. pl. 9 (1498); Newis v. Lark, 2 Plow. 403, 75 Eng. Rep. 609 (1571)
(condition good against common recovery); Earl of Arundel's Case, 3 Dyer 342b, 73 Eng.
Rep. 771, Jenk. 242, 145 Eng. Rep. 170 (1575) (dictum in the report in Jenkins, p. 243,
that condition bad against common recovery); Croker v. Trevithin, Cro. Eliz. 35, 78 Eng.
Rep. 301 (1584); Rudhall v. Milward, Moore K.B. 212, 72 Eng. Rep. 537, sub nom.
Ruddall v. Miller, 1 Leon. 298, 74 Eng. Rep. 271 (1586) (condition good against fine);
Spittle v. Davie, 2 Leon. 38, 74 Eng. Rep. 339 (1588) (condition good against lease);
Arton v. Hare, Poph. 97, 79 Eng. Rep. 1207 (1595) (condition against "going about to
alien, sell, grant or give or to suffer any recovery or levy any fine" assumed to be good);
Sharington v. Minors, Moore K.B. 543, 72 Eng. Rep. 746 (1599) (condition against
mortgage, sale or pledge good. Popham, C. J., dissented on the ground the condition was
"encounter ley" and void). A proviso that the estate should cease only as to the offending
tenant in tail and pass to his heir was ineffective, not because of the restraint on alienation
but because of technical common law rules preventing an estate from being forfeited in
part. Germin v. Ascot, Moore K.B. 364, 72 Eng. Rep. 631 (1594); Cholmeley v. Humble,
Moore K.B. 592, 72 Eng. Rep. 778 (1595); Corbet's Case, 1 Co. Rep. 83b, 76 Eng. Rep.
187 (1599); Mildmay's Case, 6 Co. Rep. 40a, 77 Eng. Rep. 311 (1605).
76 Sonday's Case, 9 Co. Rep. 127b, 77 Eng. Rep. 915 (1611) (common recovery);
Portington's Case, 10 Co. Rep. 35b, 77 Eng. Rep. 976 (1613) (common recovery); Foy
v. Hynde, Cro. Jae. 697, 79 Eng. Rep. 605 (1624) (fine); King v. Burchall, Amb. 379,
27 Eng. Rep. 252 (1759) (common recovery). The first three cases involved penalties of
forfeiture, the last a penalty by way of an equitable charge on the entailed land. Bordwell,
"Alienability and Perpetuities,'' 24 IowA L. REv. 59-66 (1938). Accord: PROPERTY RESTATEMENT §408 (1944). Justice Christiancy's classic opinion in Mandlebaum v. McDonell, 29 Mich. 78 at 93-94 (1874), quotes the reasoning in Portington's Case and cites
that in Mildmay's Case with approval.
77 Cf. Spittle v. Davie, 2 Leon. 38, 74 Eng. Rep. 339 (1588); 1 CoKll, lNsnnrr.as
223b, with contrary dicta in Mildmay's Case, 6 Co. Rep. 40a, 43a, 77 Eng. Rep. 311, 317
(1605); Portington's Case, 10 Co. Rep. 35b, 39a, 77 Eng. Rep. 976, 982 (1613).
78 Collins v. Plummer, 2 Vern. 635, 23 Eng. Rep. 1015, 1 P. Wms. 104, 24 Eng.
Rep. 313 (1708).
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give rise to an action for damages. 79 The seventeenth century decisions did not overrule those of the preceding centuries insofar as the
latter held valid restraints by way of penalty upon tortious feoffments
and other conveyances which worked a discontinuance but did not bar
the entail. 80
As a common recovery could not be suffered by a tenant for years,
attempts were soon made to create an unbarrable entail in estates for
long terms of years. These attempts were frustrated by decisions that
estates for years could not be entailed and that the first donee in tail
owned the entire term with full power of alienation. 81 As the statute
De Donis Conditionalibus applied only to land, chattels personal could
not be entailed.
On March 2, 1821 the Governor and Judges of the Territory of
Michigan adopted a law providing that all estates tail were abolished
and that all persons holding or to hold land under any devise, gift,
grant or conveyance which did, or which, but for the law would,
create a fee tail, should "be seized thereof as an allodium."82 This law
was in force until superseded by a provision of the Revised Statutes
of 1838 (p. 258) that:
"All estates tail are abolished, and every estate which would
be adjudged a fee tail, according to the law of the territory of
79 Ibid.; Freeman v. Freeman, 2 Vern. 233, 23 Eng. Rep. 751 (1691). But see Poole's
Case, cited in Tatton v. Mollineux, Moore K.B. 809, 810, 72 Eng. Rep. 920 (1610).
so 1 Cmm, INSTITUTES 223b-224a, and Butler's note No. 132 to 13th ed. (1787). See
Anonymous, 1 Brownl. & Golds. 45, 123 Eng. Rep. 655 (1616); Pierce v. Win, 1 Ventr.
321, 86 Eng. Rep. 208 (1677).
81 Tatton v. Mollineux, Moore K.B. 809, 72 Eng. Rep. 920 (1610); Lovies's Case, 10
Co. Rep. 78a, 77 Eng. Rep. 1043 (1613); Sanders v. Comish, Cro. Car. 230, 79 Eng. Rep.
801 (1631); Grig v. Hopkins, 1 Sid. 37, 82 Eng. Rep. 955 (1661).
82 Code of 1820, p. 393; Laws of 1827, p. 261; Laws of 1833, p. 278; 1 Terr. Laws,
p. 815. Sections 1 and 2 of the law provide:
"Sec. 1. Be it enacted by the G011emor and Judges of the Territory of Michigan,
That all estates tail shall be, and are hereby abolished; and that in all cases, where any
person or persons now is, or are seized in fee tail of any lands, tenements or hereditaments,
such person or persons shall be deemed to be seized of an allodial estate; And further, in
all cases where any person or persons would, if this act had not been passed, at any time
hereafter become seized in fee tail of any lands, tenements or hereditaments, by virtue of
any devise, gift, grant, or other conveyance, heretofore made or hereafter to be made or
by any other means whatsoever, such person or persons, instead of becoming seized thereof
in fee tail, shall be deemed and adjudged to be seized thereof as an allodium.
"Sec. 2. And be it further enacted, That where lands, tenements or hereditaments,
heretofore have been devised, granted or otherwise conveyed by a tenant in tail, and the
person or persons, to whom such devise, grant or other conveyance, hath been made, his,
her, or their heirs or assigns, hath or have, from the time such devise took effect, or from
the time such grant or other conveyance was made, to the day of the passing of this act,
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Michigan, as it existed before the second day of March, one
thousand eight hundred and twenty-one, shall, for all purposes,
on and after the said second day of March, be adjudged a fee
. 1e."
s1mp
There are two difficulties with the Act of 1838: (I) If the statute
De Donis Conditionalihus was not in force immediately before March
2, 1821, it is possible that no conveyance would, at that time, have
been adjudged a fee tail;83 and (2) it is not clear whether a conveyance
(if any could be) affected by the Act of 1838 created a fee simple
conditional or a fee simple absolute. The second difficulty has been
eliminated by the present statute, but the first remains. It may be
argued that both the provisions of the Revised Statutes of 1838 and
those of the statute now in force should be considered practical nullities, since no conveyance could fall within their terms and that, therefore, a conveyance which would have created an estate tail under the
statute De Donis Conditionalibus, would now create an estate in fee
simple conditional. Since March 1, 1847 the following provisions
have been on the Michigan statute books:
"Sec. 3. All estates tail are abolished, and every estate which
would be adjudged a fee tail, according to the law of the territory of Michigan, as it existed before the second (2nd) day of
March, one thousand eight hundred and twenty-one (1821), shall
for all purposes be adjudged fee simple; and if no valid remainder be limited thereon, shall be a fee simple absolute.
"Sec. 4. When a remainder in fee shall be limited upon
any estate which would be adjudged a fee tail according to the
law of the territory of Michigan as it existed previous to the time
mentioned in the preceding section, such remainder shall be valid
as a contingent limitation upon a fee, and shall vest in possession,

a

been in the uninterrupted possession of such lands, tenements or hereditaments, and claiming and holding the same under or by virtue of such devise, grant or other conveyance,
then such devise, grant or other conveyance shall be deemed as good, legal and effectual,
to all intents and purposes, as if such tenant in tail had at the time of the making of such
devise, grant or other conveyance, been seized of such lands, tenements or hereditaments
allodially, any law to the contrary hereof notwithstanding."
83 It would seem that the term "fee tail" was sometimes used before the statute De
Donis Conditionalibus in reference to conditional fees other than the maritagium. 2 PoLLOCK AND M.Ar:r.r.AND, HISTORY oF ENGLISH LAw BEFORE THE T1ME oF EDWARD I, 19, n. 6
(1895); PLuCKNE-rr, CoNCISE HISTORY OF THE CoMMON LAw 353-357 (1929). An
application of the Michigan statutes to such fees tail only, leaving the maritagium in existence as a fee simple conditional, would be awkward to say the least.
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on the death of the first taker, without issue living at the time of
such death."84
As has been shown, estates in fee tail as that term is understood
in the developed common law system are a creation of the statute
De Donis Conditionalibus. These statutory provisions only purport
to affect estates "which would be adjudged a fee tail, according to the
law of the territory of Michigan, as it existed before the second (2nd)
day of March ... 1821." Yet despite dicta suggesting that no English statutes ever were in force in Michigan85 and positive decisions
that, if any were in force they were repealed by the Act of September
16, 1810,86 the Supreme Court of Michigan has consistently applied
these statutory provisions to conveyances which would have created
fees tail under the statute De Donis Conditionalibus. 87
The effect of the Act of 1821 abolishing estates tail came before
the Supreme Court only once, in Fraser v. Chene. 88 This was a suit
in chancery to quiet title to land involving the construction of a will,
which was executed and became effective in 1829 reading:
"I give and bequeath unto my beloved son, Gabriel Chene,
my eldest, the farm I now reside on, for and during his life-time,
with all the appurtenances thereon; and after he, my said son, the
said Gabriel Chene, is deceased, then the right, title and appurtenances of the aforesaid farm, is to become the property of the
said Gabriel Chene's male heirs . . . ."
84 Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §§3, 4; Comp. Laws (1857) §§2587, 2588; Comp. Laws
(1871) §§4070, 4071; Comp. Laws (1897) §§8785, 8786; How. Stat., §§5519, 5520; Comp.
Laws (1915) §§11521, 11522; Comp. Laws (1929) §§12923, 12924; Mich. Stat. Ann.
§§26.3, 26.4; Comp. Laws (1948) §§554.3, 554.4.
Six other states have similar statutes: Cal. Civ. Code (Deering, 1949) §§763, 764;
Mont. Rev. Code (1935) §§6725, 6726; N.Y. Real Property Law (1909) §32; N.D. Rev.
Code (1943) §§47-0405, 47-0406; Okla. Stat. (1941) tit. 60, §§24, 25; S.D. Code (1939)
§§51.0405, 51.0406. The New York statute was construed in the following cases: Wilkes
v. Lion, 2 Cow. 333 (1823); Grout v. Townsend, 2 Denio 336 (1845); Van Rensselaer
v. Poucher, 5 Denio 35 (1847); Wendell v. Crandall, 1 N.Y. 491 (1848); Emmons v.
Cairns, 3 Barb. 243 (1848); Lott v. Wykoff, 2 N.Y. 355 (1849); Barlow v. Barlow, 2
N.Y. 386 (1849); Brown v. Lyon, 6 N.Y. 419 (1852); Barnes v. Hathaway, 66 Barb. 452
(1873); Buel v. Southwick, 70 N.Y. 581 (1877); Jenkins v. Fahey, 73 N.Y. 355 (1878);
Coe v. De Witt, 22 Hun. 428 (1880); Alger v. Alger, 31 Hun. 471 (1884).
85 Christiancy, J., in Trask v. Green, 9 Mich. 358 at 365 (1861); Campbell, C. J., in
In the Matter of Lamphere, 61 Mich. 105 at 108, 27 N.W. 892 (1886).
86 Note 40 supra.
87 Fraser v. Chene, 2 Mich. 81 (1851); Goodell v. Hibbard, 32 Mich. 47 (1875);
Eldred v. Shaw, 112 Mich. 237, 70 N.W. 545 (1897); Downing v. Birney, 112 Mich.
474, 70 N.W. 1006 (1897); Rhodes v. Bouldry, 138 Mich. 144, 101 N.W. 206 (1904);
Millard v. Millard, 212 Mich. 662, 180 N.W. 429 (1927); Thompson v. Thompson, 330
Mich. 1, 46 N.W. (2d) 437 (1951).
ss 2 Mich. 81 (1851).
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The plaintiff claimed under a deed from Gabriel Chene which
purported to convey a fee simple. The defendants, who were the sons
and heirs of Gabriel Chene, contended that this devise created a life
estate in Gabriel, with remainder in fee simple absolute to his male
heirs. On this point the court decided that the Rule in Shelley's Case
was in force ·in Michigan in 1829;89 in consequence of which the
devisee, Gabriel Chene, took a fee. The court held further that the
wording, was such as would have created an estate in fee tail male
prior to March 2, 1821. The act of that date was construed to convert this into an "allodial" estate, which the court assumed to mean
an estate in fee simple absolute.
This section of the Revised Statutes of 1838 abolishing entails
was never considered in a reported decision but the provisions of the
Revised Statutes of 1846, which are now in force, have been construed in several cases. Downing v. Birney9° involved a deed between
James G. Birney
"And Lorainie Spicer, wife of Ezekiel Spicer, of the same
place, of the second part, witnesseth, that, in consideration of one
hundred dollars paid by the said Ezekiel Spicer to the parties of
the first part, they have bargained and sold and do hereby convey
to the said Lorainie Spicer . . . lots. . . . To have and to hold
the said lots to the said Lorainie, to the children of her body begotten by the said Ezekiel, to her heirs, executors, and to the
assigns of the said Lorainie and Ezekiel, forever; and the said
James G. Birney, for himself, his heirs, executors and administrators, hereby covenant and agree that he will at all times defend
the lawful title hereby conveyed, to the said lots, of the said
Lorainie, to the children of her body begotten by the said Ezekiel, to her heirs, executors, and to the assigns of the said Lorainie
and Ezekiel, against the claim or claims of all persons whomsoever."
The court held that this instrument was not designed to create a
fee tail and that, therefore, the statutory provisions in question had no
89 The Rule in Shelley's Case was abolished by Rev. Stat. 1838, p. 258, which was
replaced by a clearer provision, still in force, Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §28, Comp. Laws
(1857) §2612; Comp. Laws (1871) §4095; Comp. Laws (1897) §8810; How. Stat.
§5544; Comp. Laws (1915) §11546; Comp. Laws (1929) §12948; Mich. Stat. Ann.
§26.28; Comp. Laws (1948) §554.28. Accordingly, it was held in Thompson v. Thomp·
son, 330 Mich. 1, 46 N.W. (2d) 437 (1951), that a conveyance to A for life, remainder
to the heirs of his body, created only a life estate in A, with remainder in fee simple in
the heirs of his body.
oo 112 Mich. 474, 70 N.W. 1006 (1897), 117 Mich. 675, 76 N.W. 125 (1898).
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bearing. The deed was construed to vest: (1) a life estate in Lorainie;
(2) a life estate in the children of Lorainie by Ezekiel in being at the
date of the deed, to take effect on the death of Lorainie; and (3) a
remainder in fee simple absolute in Lorainie, to take effect on the death
of the last of her children by Ezekiel.
Section 3 of chapter 62 of the Revised Statutes of 1846,' which
converts a fee tail upon which no remainder is limited into a fee
simple absolute, has been applied for this purpose only twice. In
Rhodes v. Bouldry91 a devise reading, "I bequeath the above described
lands, not only to the said Silas W. Bouldry, but to the heirs of his
body," was construed to be one which would have created a fee tail
under the statute De Donis Conditionalibus and which, therefore,
created a fee simple absolute. The other case, Millard v. Millard, 92
involved the construction of a warranty deed containing the following
language:
"This indenture made the 27th day of July in the year of
our Lord one thousand eight hundred forty-six, between Moses
Dean, of the county of Ionia and State of Michigan, of the first
part, and Charity Millard and her children, heirs of her body,
of the second part. . . . To have and to hold, the above-mentioned and described premises, with the appurtenances, and every
part and parcel thereof, to the said parties of the second part,
their heirs and assigns forever."
The court failed to consider the fact that the language of the
habendum indicated an intent that there should really be several
grantees. Regarding the words "and her children" as mere surplusage,
it determined that, since the magical words "heirs of her body" were
present, the conveyance was one which would have created a fee tail
under the statute De Donis Conditionalibus and which was transformed
into a fee simple absolute by "3 Comp. Laws 1915, S. 11521." It is
to be noted that the statutory provision applied by the court to a deed
executed in 1846 was that of the Revised Statutes of 1846, which did
not become effective until March l, 1847. The provision of the Revised
Statutes of 1838 should have been applied but the effect, no doubt,
would have been the same. 93
138 Mich. 144, 101 N.W. 206 (1904). See Thompson v. Thompson, note 89 supra.
212 Mich. 662, 180 N.W. 429 (1920).
93 There is some possibility, however, that the 1846 Act might be construed to be
retroactive and valid as such, at least in some situations. See ''Estates Tail in the United
States,'' 24 HARv. L. REv. 144 (1910). The 1821 Act clearly purported to be retroactive.
91
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At the ancient common law no remainder could be limited on an
estate in fee simple conditional. 94 The right retained by the donor
was a mere possibility and inalienable. It was not clear at first that
the statute De Donis Conditionalibus permitted the limitation of a
remainder upon the newly created estate in fee tail but it was soon
settled that it did. 95 It will be remembered that since 1847 the Michigan statute has provided that a remainder in fee limited on what would
have been a fee tail takes effect as a contingent limitatiop on a fee and
vests in possession on the death of the first taker, without issue living
at the time of such death. 96 It is to be noted that the mere birth of issue
has no effect under this provision. If the donee in tail dies with issue,
his heirs, devisees or assigns take in fee simple absolute; if he dies without issue the remainderman takes in fee simple absolute. One peculiar
effect of this provision would seem to be that the issue of the donee in
tail may never inherit, even though they survive the donee: their rights
are liable to be cut off by inter vivas conveyance of the donee in tail, by
his will, or, in part, by provisions of the statutes of descent and distribution.
The provision first received the attention of the Supreme Court
in Goodell v. Hibbard, 91 which was an action of ejectment founded on
a will containing this devise:
"Second, I give and devise all the rest, residue and remainder
of my real and personal estate, of every name and nature whatsoever, to my sister, Betsey Goodell ... ; to have and to hold the said
premises, which is described in several deeds, to the said Betsey
Goodell and her heirs, forever; and in failure of heirs, all to fall
and be bequeathed to the minor children of Alexander Goodell,
now deceased ...."
Alexander Goodell was a brother of the testator who had predeceased him, leaving four minor children. The plaintiffs claimed
under a bargain and sale deed, the only covenant of which was one of
seizin, executed by one of these children before the death of Betsey
Goodell. The court, taking into consideration the fact that Betsey
94 2 BLACKSTONE'S CoM.MENTARlES *164, 165. But see 3 HOLDSWORTH, H1sTORY OF
ENGLISH LAw, 3d ed., 18 (1923). The modem American cases are collected in 114 A.L.R.
616.
05 Note 60 supra; 3 HoLDSWORTH, HISTORY oF ENGLISH LAW, 3d ed., 18 (1923).
96 Note 84 supra.
97 32 Mich. 47 (1875). It should be noted that, in this case, the contingent estate
created by §4 of the statute was held to be alienable before taking effect in possession. See
also Mullreed v. Clark, 110 Mich. 229, 68 N.W. 138, 989 (1896).
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Goodell was an aging spinster with a large number of collateral heirs
presumptive at the time the will was executed, determined that the
word "heirs," as used in t}ie will, meant "heirs of her body." In consequence, the estate created was held to be what would have been a fee
tail in Betsey with remainder in fee simple absolute in the children of
Alexander. Applying the statute, the land passed to the children of
Alexander in fee simple absolute upon the death of Betsey without
issue.
Eldred v. Shaw98 was a suit to construe a will devising land to a
trustee for "my grandson, Rata Eldred," with directions to manage and
control until the grandson should reach the age of twenty-one, "and,
in the case of the death of my said grandson without heirs by his body
hegotten, the lands and property above described, with all its increases
or accretions, I give, devise and bequeath to my said sons, Lysander,
Henry, and William, and my said daughters, Matilda and Sally, share
and share alike, and to their heirs and assigns forever."
The grandson contended that the gift over to his uncles and aunts
would be effective only if he died during minority and that, upon
reaching majority, he became vested with title in fee simple absolute.
The circuit judge agreed with this contention but, on appeal, it was
held that the devise created an estate tail general with remainder over
-which, by force of the statute, became a fee simple subject to a contingent limitation over if the tenant should die at any time, before or
after reaching majority, without issue him surviving.
It would seem then that the statutory provision affecting remainders
limited upon estates tail will be enforced in accordance with its terms.
Its application to estates in fee tail general not restricted to issue of a
particular· sex is not difficult. As to the more complicated forms of
estates tail the effect of the statute is far from clear. Suppose a conveyance to A and the heirs male of his body, remainder to B and his
heirs, forever. If A dies leaving a daught~r as his only descendant, does
B take? A similar problem would be created by a gift to A and the
heirs of his body begotten of a particular wife, remainder to B and his
heirs, forever, if A should die leaving only issue by another wife. Presumably, in these cases, the remainder would take effect in possession if,
98 112 Mich. 237, 70 N.W. 545 (1897). In Coe v. De Witt, 22 Hun. 428 (1880),
testator devised land to "Edward B. Coe, and the heirs of his body forever, and in case of
his death without issue then living" to certain charities. Edward B. Coe conveyed the land
in his lifetime and then died, leaving a surviving daughter. It was held that the grantee
of Edward took a fee simple absolute upon the death of Edward, leaving issue.
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at the time of the first taker's death, he had not issue of the particular
class named in the conveyance.
Under Michigan law, then, the entail is completely ineffective as
a prohibition on alienation except that, when a remainder is limited
after an estate tail, the donee in tail cannot, as he could in England
after 1472, bar the remainder. The remainderman can, however, transfer his interest. 99 As the statutes convert the estate of the donee in tail
into a fee simple, the rules which govern the validity of restraints on
alienation of fees simple apply to that estate. If the remainder is in tail
the same conversion occurs. The validity of restraints on alienation of
the remainder is governed, therefore, by the rules applicable to expectant estates of types other than the fee tail.1° 0

III.

RESTRAINTS ON PossESSORY EsTATEs IN FEE SIMPLE

At the beginning of the thirteenth century when the royal courts
of justice were acquiring effective control of the development of private
law the possible forms of action and their limits were uncertain. It
seemed then that a new form of action could be devised to fit any need
which might arise. In the course of that century the courts set themselves to limiting the possible forms of action to a definite list, defining
with certainty the scope of permitted actions, and so refusing relief
upon states of fact which did not fall within the fixed limits of permitted
forms of action. This process, of course, operated to fix and limit the
classes of private rights protected by law. 101
A parallel process went on with respect to interests in land. At
the beginning of the thirteenth century, when alienation of land was
becoming possible, it seemed that any sort of interest which ingenuity
could devise might be created by apt terms in the transfer creating the
interest. Perhaps the form of the gift could create interests of any specified duration, with peculiar rules for descent, with special rights not
99 Note
100 For

97 supra.
periodical material on the treatment of fee tail in other jurisdictions, see:
Morris, ''Primogeniture and Entailed Estates in America," 27 CoL. L. R:sv. 24-51 (1927);
Lundberg, "Barring of Entails, Its Marks on Our Land Laws," 3 DAKOTA L. R:sv. 160164 (1930); Redfearn, ''Estates Tail in. Florida," 6 FLA. L.J. 69-78 (1932); Costigan,
''Equitable Fee Tail Estates-Illinois Fee Tail Statute-Shall Equity Follow the Law~" 5
ILL. L. R:sv. 514 (19II); Beals, ''Estates Tail in Kansas," 1 J. BAR A. KAN. 203-209
(1933); Turner, "Estates Tail in Kansas," 2 J. BAR A. KAN. 241-256 (1934); Hudson
"Estates Tail in Missouri," 7 ILL. L. R:sv. 355 (1913); Steiner, ''Estates Tail in Missouri,"
7 KANSAS CITY L. R:sv. 93-108 (1939); Holmested, "Estates Tail,'' 22 CAN. L.T. 426
(1902); Sanger, "Estates Tail Under the New Law,'' 2 CAMB. L.J. 212 (1925); "Estates
Tail in the United States," 15 CoL. L. R:sv. 618 (1915).
101 MArrr.AND, FoRMS oF Ac:m.oN AT COMMON LAW 51-52 (reprint 1941).
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ordinarily incident to ownership, or deprived of some of the ordinary
incidents of ownership. As in the case of the forms of action, the courts
set themselves to limiting the possible interests in land to a definite list,
defining with certainty the incidents of permitted interests, and refusing
to enforce provisions of a gift which would add to or subtract from the
fixed incidents of the type of interest conveyed. The law would recognize only a certain de.finite list of estates in land, each with fixed incidents, and every gift must be forced to fit the Procrustean bed of one or
another of these estates.102 The effect of this process in reducing widely
varying types of maritagium and entail to one estate in fee simple conditional with a fixed incident of alienability after birth of issue has been
shown in the preceding section. The statute De Donis Conditionalihus
checked the process of systematization insofar as that process tended to
impose one canon of descent and a uniform rule of alienability upon all
estates of inheritance. Beyond this it did not stop the rigid fixation of
estates and their incidents. With respect to duration, the recognized
types of estates came to be limited to those in fee simple, in fee tail, for
life, for years, at will and at sufferance. As to these, the courts would
permit slight variations in non-essential incidents but none whatever in
those considered essential. And an incident formally conferred by
statute was almost necessarily deemed essential. A provision purporting
to deprive the estate granted of an essential incident was repugnant
to the grant and void. For example, it was settled by the first decade
of the seventeenth century that every estate in fee tail was endowed
by law with certain inseparable incidents, that among these incidents
were dower, curtesy and the right to bar the entail by common recovery,
and that any provision purporting to deprive an ·estate tail of any of
these incidents or penalize its enjoyment was void. 103
As has been seen, the Statute of Westminster III, Quia Emptores
T errarum, made two important provisions as to estates in fee simple,
first, that the donor of such an estate could not retain a reversion, and
102 2 HoLDSWORTH, HisTORY OF ENGLISH LAw, 4th ed., 349-352 (1936); 3 id., 3d
ed., 101-105 (1923); Bordwell, "Alienability and Perpetuities," 22 lowA L. REv. 437 at
444-445 (1937). "For the sake of certainty and stability, the law has classified and defined
all the various interests and estates in lands which it recognizes the right of any individual
to hold or create, and the definition of each is made from, and the estate known and recognized by the combination of certain legal incidents, many of which are so essential to the
particlar species of estate that they cannot, by the parties creating it, be severed from it, as
this would be to create a new and mongrel estate unknown to the law, and productive of
confusion and uncertainty." Christiancy, J., in Mandlebaum v. McDowell, 29 Mich. 78
at 92 (1874).
103 Sir Anthony Mildmay's Case, 6 Co. Rep. 40a, 41a, 77 Eng. Rep. 311, 314 (1605);
Mary Portington's Case, IO Co. Rep. 35b, 38b-39a, 77 Eng. Rep. 976, 982 (1613).
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second, that the owner might "sell at his own pleasure his lands and
tenements, or part of them."104 A remainder being analogous to a
reversion105 the first provision operated to prevent the limitation of a
remainder after a fee simple.106 That the statute made free alienability
an inseparable incident of every estate in fee simple seems always to
have been assumed by the judges and lawyers of England. Knowing
this, and realizing that such an attempt would be nugatory, English
conveyancers have not attempted to restrain alienation of legal estates
in fee simple by prohibition and there is a consequent dearth of English
decisions as to such restraints. American lawyers have not always understood so well the system of estates, and conveyancing by laymen has been
more common here. By the overwhelming weight of authority in this
country a prohibition on alienation of a legal fee simple, that is, a provision that a transfer by the owner shall be wholly inoperative and leave
him still owner, is a nullity, whether extending to all alienation or
limited to alienation in a particular manner, alienation during a limited
period, or alienation to specified persons or classes of persons.107
As to restraints by way of penalty, it has been settled in England
since the fourteenth century that a proviso in a conveyance in fee simple
that the estate shall be forfeited upon any alienation is void. 108 The
104 Stat. 18 Edw. I, stat. 1, c. 1 (1290); 2 CoKE, lNsTITUT.Es 66, 67. The language
of the statute, as printed in the Statutes at Large, is, "quod de cetero liceat unicuique libero
homini terram suam seu tenementum peu partem inde pro voluntate sua vendere." In
Mayn v. Cros, Y.B. 14 Hen. IV, Mich., pl. 6 (1412), Justice Hankford said, at f. 3b, "le
statute voit, 'Quod quilibet liber homo possit dare et vendere terram suam.' " Sir Edward
Coke (whose version of the statute varies slightly from that of the Statutes at Large) says,
"'Vendere' is here not onely taken for a sale, but for any alienation by gift, feoffment, fine,
or otherwise: But sale was the most common assurance.'' 2 lNsTITUTES 501.
1051 CoKE, lNsTITUTEs 373b (Butler's Note No. 328 to 13th ed. 1787); Bordwell,
"Alienability and Perpetuities," 24 IowA L. REv. 635 at 655-656 (1939).
106 1 FEARNB, CoNTINGENT REMAINDERS, 5th ed., 7 (1794).
107The cases are collected in GRAY, REsTRAINTs ON ALIENATION, 2d ed., 91-133
(1895); Manning, "The Development of Restraints on Alienation since Gray," 48 HARv.
L. REv. 373-406 (1935); Schnebly, ''Restraints Upon the Alienation of Legal Interests,"
44 YALE L.J. 961-995, 1186-1215 (1935). Accord: PROPERTY REsTAT.EMENT §405 (1944).
The Restatement and Professor Schnebly refer to prohibitions on alienation as "disabling
restraints." Id., §404.
10s Anonymous, Liber Assissarum 33 Edw. III, pl. 11 (1359); Mayn v. Cros, Y.B.
14 Hen. IV, Mich., pl. 6 (1412); Anonymous, Y.B. 21 Hen. VI, Hil., pl. 21 (1443);
Anonymous, Y.B. 8 Hen. VII, Hil., pl. 3 (1493); Anonymous, Y.B. 10 Hen. VII, Mich.,
pl. 28 (1494); Anonymous, Y.B. 13 Hen. VII, Pasch., pl. 9 (1498); Vernon's Case, 4
Co. Rep. la, 3b, 76 Eng. Rep. 845, 854 (1572); Shailard v. Baker, Cro. Eliz. 744, 78
Eng. Rep. 977 (1600); STATHAM, AimIDGEMENT, "Conditions," pl. 12 (1495); BROOKE,
GRAUNDE ABRIDGEMENT, "Conditions,'' pl. 57, 135, 239 (1573); 1 CoKE, INsnToT.Es
222b-223a. Shailard v. Baker involved a condition in a will, the other cases conditions in
inter vivos conveyances. As in the case of estates tail, restraint by way of penalty on types
of conveyance which had purely tortious operation, working a discontinuance, were upheld.
Anonymous, Y.B. 10 Hen. VII, Mich., pl. 28 (1494); BROOKE, id., pl. 239.
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same rule obtains in this country.109 Sir Thomas Littleton, writing in
the fifteenth century, expressed the rule in this wise,
"Sect. 360. Also, if a feoffment be made upon this condition,
that the feoffee shall not alien the land to any, this condition is
void; because, when a man is infeoffed of lands or tenements, he
hath power to alien them to any person by the law. For if such a
condition should be good, then the condition should oust him of
all the power which the law gives him, which should be against
reason, and therefore such a condition is void."110
·
So much is clear. Unfortunately for the clarity of the law, Sir
Thomas added,
"Sect. 361. But if the condition be such, that the feoffee shall
not alien to such a one, naming his name, or to any of his heirs,
or of the issues of such a one, etc., or the like, which conditions do
not take away all power of alienation from the feoffee, etc. then ·
such condition is good."111
.
Littleton's exception to the general rule was repeated by way of
dictum in a case decided twelve years after the publication of his
treatise112 but it seems inconsistent with the reasoning of the opinions
which declare the general rule.113 Those cases hold that conditions in
restraint of alienation of an estate in fee simple are void because (I)
they are repugnant to the grant, that is, their operation would tend
to deprive the estate of the inseparable incident of alienability conferred upon it by the statute Quia Emptores Terrarum, 114 and (2)
restraints on alienation may be imposed only in favor of a reversion or
remainder following the estate restrained and, by force of the same
statute, no reversion or remainder ·may follow· a fee simple.111' In a
109 The cases are collected in GRAY, RllsTRAINTs ON ALIENATION, 2d ed., 8-25 (1895)
and the articles cited in note 107 supra. Accord: PROPERTY RllsTATBMBNl' §406, comment
d, §407 (1944).
llOTENURBS §360 (1481).
111Id., §361; I CoKB, lNsTITUTBS 223a-223b. See SHBP.PAIID, ToucHSTONB OP
CoMMoN AssURANcEs 129-130 (1648); Sweet, "Restraints on Alienation,'' 33 L.Q. Rllv.
236 at 242-243 (1917).
112 Anonymous, Y.B. 8 Hen. VII, Hil., pl. 3, f. IOb (1493), per Hussey, C. J.
113 Pearson, J., in In re Rosher, [1884] 26 Ch. Div. 801 at 813-814. Chancellor Kent
says of this section, "But this case falls within the general principle, and it may be very
questionable whether such a condition would be good at this day." 4 CoMMBNl'ARIBS "'131.
114 Anonymous, Liber Assissarum, 33 Edw. III, pl. 11 (1359); Mayn v. Cros, Y.B.
14 Hen. IV, Mich., pl. 6 (1412); Anonymous, Y.B. 10 Hen. VII, Mich., pl. 28 (1494);
Anonymous, Y.B. 13 Hen. VII, Pasch., pl. 9 (1498); Shailard v. Baker, Cro. Eliz. 744, 78
Eng. Rep. 977 (1600).
115Yelverton, J., in Anonymous, Y.B. 21 Hen. VI, Hil., pl. 21 (1443); Hussey, C. J.,
in Anonymous, Y.B. 8 Hen. VII, Hil., pl. 3 (1493); Bordwell, "Alienability and Perpetuities," 23 IowA L. Rllv. I at 11-13 (1938).
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case decided in I 443 Justice Paston argued that the existence of a
reversion or remainder had no bearing, that restraints on alienation were
void only because of "inconvenience."116 This view was decisively
rejected, not only in that case but in the sixteenth and seventeenth
century decisions which developed the law of restraints on alienation on
estates in fee tail, for life and for years. Nevertheless, some modern
writers, notably Professor John Chipman Gray, have tried to explain
and support the law of restraints on alienation solely on the ground
of public policy, rather than the technical common law rules as to
estates.117 No doubt there are objections of public policy to a complete
restraint on alienation of property for an extended period but public
policy alone does not explain the technical rules which govern restraints
on alienation of estates in fee simple. For example, where, as in Michigan,118 the Rule in Shelley's Case has been abolished it is possible to
convey a life estate to John Stiles, remainder in fee simple to his heirs,
with a proviso that if John transfers his life estate it shall be forfeited.
Professor Gray would concede the validity of this penalty restraint upon
the alienation of the life estate.119 On the other hand, if land is conveyed to John Stiles in fee simple with a proviso that if John transfers
an estate for his own life his estate in fee simple shall be forfeited and
the land pass to Andrew Baker for the life of John and then to John's
heirs, the restraint upon alienation is, in Professor Gray's opinion,
void. 120 So far as removing land from commerce is concerned, one
restraint has an effect which is virtually identical with that of the other.
Public policy is no explanation of why one is good and the other bad.
The true explanation was given us five hundred years ago by Justice
Hankford, who pointed out that the statute Quia Emptores Terrarum
conferred an inseparable incident of alienability upon every estate in
fee simple,1 21 and by Justice Yelverton, who pointed out that the statute
prohibited the retention of a reversion after a fee simple to which the
restraint on alienation could be annexed. 122
116 Anonymous, Y.B. 21 Hen. VI, Hil., pl. 21 (1443). He was contending that restraints on alienation in a lease for years are void, a contention long since overruled.
117 GRAY, R:sSTRAINTS ON ALIENAnoN, 2d ed., II (1895); Sweet, ''Restraints on
Alienation," 33 L.Q. R:sv. 236, 243 (1917); Schnebly, "Restraints upon the Alienation of
Legal Interests," 44 YALE L.J. 961-966 (1935); PROPERTY R:ssTATEMllNT Introductory
Note to Div. IV, Part II, ''Rationale." Manning, "The Development of Restraints on
Alienation since Gray," 48 HAnv. L. R:sv. 373-374 (1935), appears to recognize the
inadequacy of public policy as an explanation of the law as it is.
118 Note 89 supra.
110 R:ssTRAINTs ON ALlENAnoN, 2d ed., 72 (1895).
120 Id. at 33-42.
121 Mayn v. Cros, Y.B. 14 Hen. IV, Mich., pl. 6 (1412).
122 Anonymous, Y.B. 21 Hen. VI, Hil., pl. 21 (1443).
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Professor Maitland remarked, "The forms of action we have buried,
but they still rule us from their graves."123 So it is with the doctrine of
estates. The nineteenth century saw numerous efforts to abolish common law rules of property, such as the Rule in Shelley's Case, which
operate to defeat intention. The theory behind such efforts seems to
have been that the real, subjective intention of every testator and
granter should be carried out fully unless the effect of its execution is
contrary to public policy. The success of these efforts, like the contemporary efforts to abolish the forms of action, has been much qualified.
We may be thankful that it is so. The judges of the thirteenth century
remembered a period when great stress had been laid upon carrying out
the intention of the donor, no matter how whimsical or capricious,
unless it contravened some ill-defined standard of public policy. They
knew the effect of such a stress, namely, that there can be innumerable
types of interests in land with widely varying and doubtful incidents;
that the effect of a conveyance is uncertain until there has been litigation to determine the true intent of the donor and its compatibility with
public policy. They sought to achieve simplicity and certainty as to
titles by limiting the possible interests in land to a very few, with fixed
and inseparable incidents. They must have known that, in doing so,
they were defeating the intention of donors. But the land belongs to
the living, not to the dead. The generation now alive should have
certain titles and known rights of enjoyment even at the expense of
thwarting the expressed wish of some long-dead and half-forgotten
testator or donor. The rules which Justices Hankford and Yelverton
laid down were not unreasonable. The law of their day permitted
perpetually inalienable estates in fee tail;. why should it permit any
other inalienable estate of inheritance? The owner of a reversion or
vested remainder which is certain to become possessory within a relatively few years has a real interest in the personal characteristics of the
tenant in possession; no one else has sufficient interest to warrant allowing him to interfere with alienation by the tenant in possession.
If the true basis of the rules governing restraints on alienation of
estates in fee simple lies in the two provisions of the statute Quia
Emptores, T errarum, no such restraint should be valid and Justice
Littleton's exception in section 361 as to restraints limited to alienation
to a named man, his heirs or issue, is wrong in principle. Even if it is
sound, it should not be extended to restraints which are more comprehensive than the examples he gives. Littleton's statement in section 360
123 FoRMs OP AcnoN AT CoMMON LAW 2 (reprint 1941).
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of the general invalidity of restraints on alienation of fees simple
describes a restraint which is limited in time to the lifetime of the
feoffee. 124 Hence his statement that conditions which "do not take
away all power of alienation"125 are good cannot extend to restraints
which are general in scope and limited only in duration.126 Certainly
it should not be extended to the converse of the example given, i.e., to
a restraint upon all alienation except to a certain person.127
Probably because it is inconsistent with the common law doctrine
of estates and so an unsure foundation for further development, section
361 of Littleton's Tenures, asserting the validity of limited penalty
restraints on alienation of estates in fee simple, has caused confusion in
the law, both in England and in this country.128 The Restatement of
Property takes the position that a penalty restraint upon alienation of a
legal possessory estate in fee simple is valid if ( 1) qualified so as to
permit alienation to some though not all possible alienees, and (2)
reasonable under the circumstances.129 This rule denies the validity of
restraints which are general in scope so far as alienees are concerned
but qualified as to duration130 or as to manner of alienation131 but in
other respects it does not provide a certain and definite standard against
which to test the validity of limited restraints.
The Michigan statutes adopt the common law classification of
estates in land into estates of inheritance, estates for life, estates for
years, and estates at will and by sufferance and establish the estate in
fee simple as the only permissible type of estate of inheritance.132 As
these statutory provisions were adopted verbatim from the New York
Revised Statutes of 1830, Chancellor Kent's remark, "The technical
language of the common law was too deeply rooted in our usages and
124 Note llO supra.
125 Note ll 1 supra.
126 Jn re Rosher, [1884] 26 Ch. Div. 801.
127 Mr. Serjeant Bridgman in Muschamp v.

Bluet, J. Bridg. 132 at 137, 123 Eng. Rep.
1253 at 1256 (1617).
128 The English cases are collected in Sweet, "Restraints on Alienation," 33 L.Q.
R:Ev. 236-253, 342-362 (1917); the American cases in GRAY, R:EsTRAINTS ON AuENATION,
2d ed., 25-69 (1895) and the articles cited in note 107 supra. Much of the English confusion was eliminated by Justice Pearson's wise reliance in In re Rosher, [1884] 26 Ch.
Div. 801 on the reasoning in Justice Christiancy's brilliant opinion in Mandlebaum v.
McDonell, 29 Mich. 78 (1874).
129 Sections 406, 407 (1944).
130 Id., §406, comment e.
131 Id., §406, comment f.
132Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §§1 to 5; Comp. Laws (1857) §§2585 to 2589; Comp. Laws
(1871) §§4068 to 4072; Comp. Laws (1897) §§8783 to 8787; How. Stat. §§5517 to 5521;
Comp. Laws (1915) §§11519 to 11523; Comp. Laws (1929) §§12921 to 12925; Mich.
Stat. Ann. §§26.1 to 26.5; Comp. Laws (1948) §§554.1 to 554.5.
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institutions, to· be materially affected by legi_slative enactrnents,"133 is
apt. In adopting the common law classification of estates our legislature
must have intended to give the terms the meaning they had at common
law, that is, to adopt the common law definitions and incidents of
estates, except as they are modified by our statutes. So far as legal
estates are concerned, our statutory modifications tend to increase alienability. They certainly do not favor restrictions upon it. The incidents
of an estate in fee simple were fixed in part by the statute Quia
Emptores T errarum. The term "fee simple" has no meaning in the
developed common law without assuming that fixation. Our courts
have assumed, .as indeed they .must, that by adopting the· term, the
statutes adopt the incidents of the estate as known to the developed
common law.134

A. 'Restraints on Alienation Inter Vivas
Walton v. T orrey1 35 was a suit brought by the widow and children
of Jesse Hicks who died in 1825 leaving a will directing that his land
remain undivided in the use and occupation of his children until the
youngest should reach twenty-one, then to be divided among them and
the heirs of any who might die, subject to a life estate of the widow in
the homestead and a third of the profits of the farm. The widow and a
son who was of age conveyed their interests to the defendant and the
interest of the minor children was conveyed to the defendant under
license of the probate court. Chancellor Farnsworth denied an injunction against the defendant's asserting title under these conveyances,
saying that the direction against division should not be construed as an
attempt to inhibit any of the devisees from conveying whatever interest
he possessed and that provisions in restraint of alienation are not to be
favored. The will, as so construed, did not purport to restrain the
type of transfer involved so there was no occasion for a decision as to
the validity of such a restraint.
·
Campau v. Chene,1 36 was a suit to quiet title brought by the heirs
of Jean Baptiste .Campau against the devisees of Gabriel Chene. In
1800 Campau conveyed the land in question to Chene in fee simple,
1sa 4 CoMMEN'l'AllIES, "3.
184 See Mandlebaum v. McDonell,

29 Mich. 78 at 92 (1874). The will involved in
this case became operative before the effective date of the Revised Statutes of 1846 but
the Revised Statutes of 1838 had adopted, at least by implication, the common law classification of estates, including fees simple. Pp. 257-269.
·
135 Harr. Ch. 259 (Mich. circa 1836).
136 I Mich. 400 (1850).
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the deed providing that the grantee promised and obligated himself to
pay £, 1000 and to support the grantor for life,
"And for the security of the said payment of one thousand
pounds, in the manner above mentioned, and for the fulfilling of
the clauses and conditions here above expressed, the said Gabriel
cannot give, alienate, exchange or sell the said farm or land, . . .
without the permission or assent of the said Jean Baptiste Campau,
... till the payment in full of said one thousand pounds."
The plaintiffs contended that these provisions constituted a condition
subsequent and that they were entitled to enter for breach. The court
held that the provisions were not a condition but a covenant secured
by a lien on the land, supporting its construction by the remark, "If the
covenant against alienation could be considered a condition, it would be
void. For a condition annexed to a conveyance, in fee or devise, that the
purchaser should not alien, is unlawful and void. 4 Kent's Com.
126."137
Mandlebaum v. McDonell188 was a suit to quiet title to land which
now forms part of the site of the Federal Building in Detroit. John
McDonell died in 1846 leaving a will, executed the year before, which,
as construed by the court, devised a legal life estate to his widow with
legal remainder in fee simple to his four sons, an adopted daughter and
a grandson, " . . . upon the express condition . . . that it shall not be
competent for any of my devisees hereinbefore named to either dispose
of, alienate, mortgage, barter, pledge or transfer any portion of the real
estate," until the grandson reached twenty-five years of age, or until
twenty-one years from the date of the will in case of his death, and not
then while the widow was living and had not remarried. During the
lifetime of the widow, who had not remarried, and while the grandson
was less than twenty-five years of age, the four sons, the adopted daughter and the grandson executed conveyances of their remainder interests,
under which the plaintiff claimed. The suit was brought after the death
of the widow against the devisees in remainder and the administrator
cum testamento annexo of the testator, who denied the effectiveness of
the conveyances previously made.

187 Id. at 414. Relief by way of foreclosure of the lien was denied on the ground of
Iaches. The citation should be to 4 KENT, CoMMENTARIEs, "131. This is the passage in
which Chancellor Kent questions the soundness of Justice Littleton's approval of limited
restraints on alienation of a fee simple. Note 113 supra.
138 29 Mich. 78, 18 Am. Rep. 61 (1874). This case involves the effect of a restraint
on alienation on a vested remainder in fee rather than on a possessory estate in fee. It is
mentioned here because the ground of decision necessarily includes possessory estates as
well as vested remainders.
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The court, in an excellently reasoned opinion by Justice Christiancy
which has become a classic exposition of the law of restraints on alienation, determined that the language of the will purported to restrain
alienation by prohibition, that is, to make conveyances by the devisees
completely ineffective, not merely to penalize them. In words broad
enough to extend to all legal interests, the court denied the validity of
such a prohibition, pointing out that it could have no beneficiary except
the devisees themselves and that an obligation owed only to themselves
could be released by them. "But lest this may be thought too narrow a
ground" the opinion proceeds to a review of the development of the
English law of restraints on alienation of fees simple by way of
penalty.139 In language reminiscent of Justices Hankford and Yelverton, Justice Christiancy rested the invalidity of such provisions upon the
twin grounds of repugnancy to the grant, i.e., that they tend to deprive
the estate of an inseparable incident conferred upon it by the statute
Quia Emptores T errarum, and lack of a reversion or remainder to which
the benefit of the restraint can be annexed. He questioned the soundness, in principle, of Littleton's section 361, pointed out that it related
to a restraint limited at all times as to alienees, and concluded,
"But however competent it may be, under the authorities, to
impose upon an estate in fee, a condition against alienation to
certain specified persons, it does not follow, and the authorities
upon the point have no tendency to show, that a condition against
selling such an estate at all to any party or parties, for a long, or
for any period of time, would be valid....
"We are entirely satisfied there has never been a time since
the statute quia emptores when a restriction in a conveyance of a
vested estate in fee simple, in possession or remainder, against selling for a particular period of time, was valid by the common law.
And we think it would be unwise and injurious to admit into the
law the principle contended for by the defendant's counsel, that
such restrictions should be held valid, if imposed only for a reasonable time. It is safe to say that every estate depending upon such a
question would, by the very fact of such a question existing, lose
a large share of its market value. Who can say whether the time is
reasonable, until the question has been settled in the court of last
resort; and upon what standard of certainty can the court decide
it? . . . The only safe rule of decision is to hold, as I understand
139 Id. at 91-107. A condition subsequent, even if valid, could not have penalized
alienation under the peculiar facts of the case. The devisees were the sole heirs of the
testator and so owners of any right of entry on breach of condition subsequent which he
might reserve by his will.
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the common law for ages to have been, that a condition or restriction which would suspend all power of alienation for a single day,
is inconsistent with the estate granted, unreasonable and void.
"Certainty in the law of real estate, as to the incidents and
nature of the several species of estates and the effect of the recognized instruments and modes of transfer, is of too much importance to be sacrificed to the unskillfulness, the whims or caprices
of a few peculiar individuals in isolated cases."140

An earlier passage in the opinion had pointed out that a restraint
on alienation, of the same scope and duration, could, perhaps, have been
imposed validly by means of the trust device.141 The quoted language
makes it clear, therefore, that the decision in Mandlebaum v. McDonell
is not based upon any public policy favoring free alienability of land;
it is grounded squarely upon the technical common law rules of estates,
rules which were made and which still operate to make interests in
land certain and definite.
Barrie v. Smith142 did not involve a direct restraint on alienation but
it did raise a problem which has an important bearing upon the validity
of penalty restraints on alienation under our statutes. The plaintiffs
had conveyed land in fee simple by a deed providing that if the grantees,
their heirs or assigns, should sell or keep for sale intoxicating liquor
thereon or permit anyone under them to do so, title should revert to the
grantors, their heirs and assigns, and they might reenter. Defendant,
a mesne purchaser from the original grantees, commenced operating a
saloon on the land and plaintiffs brought ejectment to enforce their
right of entry. The Michigan statutes provide,
'When any conditions annexed to a grant or conveyance of
lands are merely nominal, and evince no intention of actual and
substantial benefit to the party to whom or in whose favor they are
to be performed, they may be wholly disregarded, and a failure to
perform the same shall in no case operate as a forfeiture of the
lands conveyed subject thereto." 143
140 Id. at 97, 107. Fuller v. McKim, 187 Mich. 667, 154 N.W. 55 (1915), involved
a restraint on alienation of a fee simple general in scope but limited in duration. A testatrix domiciled in Michigan devised in fee New York land which was subject to a twentyyear lease with a direction that the land should not be sold during the term of the existing
lease. The court refused to determine the validity of this restraint, saying it was a question for the New York courts. See also Bennett v. Chapin, 77 Mich. 526, 43 N.W. 893
(1889).
141 29 Mich. 78 at 88.
142 47 Mich. 130, IO N.W. 168 (1881).
143 Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §46; Comp. Laws (1857) §2630; Comp. Laws (1871)
§4113; Comp. Laws (1897) §8828; How. Stat. §5562; Comp. Laws (1915) §11564; Comp.
Laws (1929) §12966; Mich. Stat. Ann. §26.46; Comp. Laws (1948) §554.46.
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The court held that the plaintiffs could not recover without proof
that performance of the condition would be of substantial benefit to
them; that the benefit of being able to assert a right of entry upon breach
was not in itself sufficient to validate the condition. This statutory
provision, so interpreted, evinces a policy analogous to the common law
rule that conditions in restraint of alienation are valid only if imposed
for the benefit of a reversion or remainder in the lands involved. That
the statutory rule is narrower than that of the common law, however, is
shown by the decision of the court, after the plaintiffs had proved on a
new trial that they owned a mill near the land in question and were
interested in keeping their employees sober, that such a benefit, arising
from ownership of land other than that burdened with it, was sufficient
to support the condition.144 The operation of the statute was narrowed
further by a later decision that it is applicable only to conditions in
inter vivos conveyances and does not invalidate conditions in wills. 145
Even as so limited, however, the statute may operate to invalidate some
conditions which, because imposed upon estates less than a fee simple
for the benefit of a reversion or remainder in the same land, would be
valid at common law.

Aultman, Miller & Co. v. Pettys, 146 was a suit to foreclose a mortgage given by Daniel Pettys wh9 died before the suit was started. Before
executing the mortgage Pettys had entered into an antenuptial contract
with the defendant in which he covenanted that, if the defendant sur. vived him, his executors, administrators or assigns would convey the
land to the defendant in fee and both parties covenanted, "that neither
party hereto, during the lifetime of the other party: shall bargain, sell,
alien, or convey, or shall incumber by mortgage, lease or otherwise, the
said premises, without being joined by the other party in such bargain,
sale, alienation, conveyance or incumbrance."
144 Smith v. Barrie, 56 Mich. 314, 22 N.W. 816 (1885). The opinion, by Cooley,
C. J., contains dictum that a condition in general restraint of alienation is always void. 56
Mich. 317, 22 N.W. 818.
.
145 Johnson v. Warren, 74 Mich. 491, 42 N.W. 74 (1889). Another later decision
broadens the operation of the statute beyond its express words by holding that the substantial benefit must continue to the time of breach. Abraham v. Stewart, 83 Mich. 7, 46
N.W. 1030 (1890).
146 59 Mich. 482, 26 N.W. 680 (1886). In Mertens v. Mertens, 314 Mich. 651, 23
N.W. (2d) 114 (1946), the court approved a provision in a divorce decree, inserted by
consent, which forbade either party to dispose of the property assigned to him without the
consent of the court. Such approval seems unsound and a dangerous precedent when it is
recalled that for centuries most English conveyancing was done by means of collusive or
consent judgments·.

1952]

RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION

711

The court affirmed a decree dismissing the bill in language which
implies the validity of the quoted restraint on alienation. On its face
this decision would appear to constitute specific enforcement of a covenant in general restraint of alienation of an estate in fee simple. Specific
enforcement of such a covenant seems to have been denied even before
the enactment of the statute Quia Emptores T errarum.147 If granted,
it converts the restraint on alienation into a prohibition which forces
the owner to retain the land in spite of his efforts to transfer it, thus
imposing much more than a penalty for alienation. In actuality, however, the antenuptial contract was a covenant to stand seised which
operated as a conveyance of a contingent springing use to the defendant.
The only thing decided was that Petty's mortgage could not bind his
wife's contingent future interest. That result would follow even if
there had been no attempt to impose a restraint on alienation by covenant. The validity of the covenant against alienation was not involved
in the decision and the case is not properly a precedent as to the validity
or specific enforceability of such a covenant. Nevertheless, it stands in
the books, a trap for the unwary.
Smith v. Smith148 was an action of ejectrnent brought by the executor of Joseph Smith, deceased. Joseph had executed a quit claim deed
conveying land to his son Thomas "and to his heirs for the use, benefit,
and support of himself and his family, and the proper education of his
children," habendum, "to have and to hold for the period of his natural
life, and after his death to his children in fee-simple," Thomas covenantmg,
"That he will, during the period of his natural life, keep and
preserve the same free and clear from levies, liens, and incumbrances....
"That he will make no conveyance of any interest therein during the life-time of any of his children, or of any of his brothers
and sisters."
Thomas conveyed the land to the defendant, his wife, and died,
leaving a will by which he devised all his land to the defendant.
Thomas had no children. It is inferable from the opinion that he had
brothers and sisters living at the time of his death. The plaintiff proceeded on the theory that the deed to Thomas conveyed only a life
estate, with contingent remainder to his children. The court rejected
147 Note 5 supra.
148 71 Mich. 633,

40 N.W. 21 (1888).
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this contention, holding that the habendum was repugnant to the
grant and so void; that the deed conveyed a fee simple to Thomas,
which was owned by the defendant at the time of trial. The opinion
does not decide whether the defendant's title rested on her husband's
deed or on his will. Neither court nor counsel raised the question of
the validity of the covenants against alienation but it may be inferred
that, if the habendum was void as repugnant to the grant, the covenants
were also. The action being in ejectment, however, the decision is not
a precedent as to the enforceability of such covenants.
Bassett v. Budlong149 was an action of ejectment brought by the
heirs of Annette Budlong. In 1873 William H. Budlong had executed
a quit-claim deed of the land to Annette, his wife, in the form usual
to conveyance of a fee simple. Following the habendum the following language was inserted:
"Provided, always, and this indenture is made (in all respects)
upon these express conditions and reservations, that is to say:
First, it is reserved that said party of the second part shall not,
at any time during the lifetime of the said party of the £.rst part,
convey to any person or persons, by deed, mortgage, or otherwise,
the whole or any part of the said premises, as above described,
without the written assent of the said party of the fast part, or his
joining in such conveyance. Second, it is further reserved that, in
case of the decease or death of the said Annette Budlong, party of
the second part, at any time before the decease or death of the
said William H. Budlong, party of the first part, then, in such case,
and upon such decease, the said premises, . . . shall forthwith,
upon said decease, revert back unto the said William H. Budlong,
of the first part, and to his assigns forever."
Annette predeceased her husband and he died, devising the land
to the defendant. The court reversed a judgment for the plaintiffs on
the ground that, so far as the fee was concerned, the conveyance was
intended to be contingent upon the wife's surviving, saying,
"The condition in the deed that his wife should not convey
or mortgage the land without his written assent, or joining in the
deed, is a clear indication that the title should not pass, because if
it was the intention that it should pass, and the estate vest in his
wife, the condition would be nugatory; and no force or effect be
given to this part of the instrument."ir;o

The restraint on alienation here involved was merely a restatement
140 77
1i;0Jd.

Mich. 338, 43 N.W. 984 (1889).
at 347.
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of the common law disability of a married woman to convey her land
without her husband's consent or joinder.151 That disability was removed by the Married Women's Act of 1855152 and the language of
the court just quoted is clearly a statement that a condition purporting
to restrain the exercise of the power of alienation conferred by that
act is void. The opinion in Bassett v. Budlong has sometimes been misunderstood to assert the validity of conditions in restraint of alienation
and so qualify the opinion in Mandlebaum v. McDonell.153 It does not
do so; indeed, it reasserts and extends the doctrine of that opinion.

In re Estate of Schilling154 was an appeal from a probate order of
distribution under a will which devised land to four children of the
testatrix and the children of a fifth and provided, "None of my said
real estate shall be sold or divided between my said heirs before my
youngest child is at the age of 21 years." The court held that this
prohibition on alienation was void as attempting to deprive an estate
in fee of one of its essential features, the right to convey, and so repugnant to the nature of the estate.
Howard v. McCarthy1 55 was an action of ejectment brought by
the heirs of Shepard L. Howard. In 1872 Francis A. Howard and
Abbie L. Patrick conveyed lands to Shepard L. Howard by separate
quit-claim deeds, each, as to grant and habendum, in the form usual
to conveyance of a fee simple. The following provision was inserted
between the grant and habendum of one deed, "And it is provided that
the said party of the second part shall not sell the above described lands
and premises, but that after his decease the above described lands and
premises shall descend to the heirs of the aforesaid Shepard L. Howard." The other deed contained a provision, inserted in the same position, as follows: "And it is hereby provided and the intention of this
151 Restated in Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 85, §25.
152 "The real and personal estate of every female

• . . may be contracted, sold, transferred, mortgaged, conveyed, devised or bequeathed by her in the same manner and with
like effect as if she were unmarried." Act 168, P. A. 1855; Comp. Laws (1857) §3292;
Comp. Laws (1871) §4803; Comp. Laws (1897) §8690; How. Stat. §6295; Comp. Laws
(1915) §11485; Comp. Laws (1929) §13057; Mich. Stat. Ann. §26.161; Comp. Laws
(1948) §557.1. The power to devise and bequeath was conferred by the Constitutions of
1850 and 1908. CoNsT. 1850, art. 16, §5; CoNsT. 1908, art. 16, §8.
158 Note 138 supra. It was held in Watkins v. Minor, 214 Mich. 380, 183 N.W. 186
(1921), that Bassett v. Budlong does not overrule or modify Mandlebaum v. McDonell.
154 102 Mich. 612 sub nom. Moore v. Schindehette, 61 N.W. 62 (1894). The opinion
contains language (102 Mich. 617, 61 N.W. 63) which may mean that a restraint on
alienation of a defeasibly vested interest is valid, even though the interest is possessory1
at least so long as the defeasibility exists. The soundness of such a view is very questionable. See PROPERTY RESTATEMENT §§407, 411 (1944); note 370 infra.
m 232 Mich. 175, 205 N.W. 169 (1925).
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conveyance is declared to be that the said party of the second part shall
have the use and possession only of the premises above conveyed, but
not the power or right to sell the same, and after his decease the said
bargained land and premises shall descend to the heirs of the aforesaid
Shepard L. Howard."
In 1889 Shepard L. Howard, Francis A. Howard and Abbie L.
Patrick joined in a conveyance of the land under which the defendants claimed. A judgment for the defendants was affirmed by an
equally divided court. The justices who favored reversal thought that
the deeds conveyed a life estate to Shepard L. Howard with contingent remainder in fee to his heirs and that the prohibitions on alienation
were intended only to prevent his destroying the contingent remainder,
which he could not do in any event under the Michigan statutes.1116
The justices who favored affirmance seem to have agreed with the
defendants' contentions that the 1872 deeds conveyed a fee simple to
Shepard L. Howard and that the prohibitions on alienation of that
estate were void. Their opinion suggests that if the 1872 deeds conveyed only a life estate, the reversion in fee was left in Francis A. Howard and Abbie L. Patrick and passed by their joinder in the 1889 deed.
The latter construction seems definitely unsound. The proper construction would appear to be that contended for by the defendants,
that the 1872 deeds conveyed a fee simple and that the prohibitions on
alienation, although limited in duration to the life of the grantee, were
void under the rule laid down in Mandlehaum v. McDonell. 151 Although the result reached is in harmony with this view, it would seem
unfortunate that the court did not take this opportunity to reaffirm the
doctrine of the Mandlehaum case in clear and unmistakable terms.

Porter v. Barrett1 58 ranks with Mandlehaum v. McDonell as a leading case on the law of restraints on alienation. The plaintiffs sold land
by executory contract to Louis Parent, who assigned his interest to
Wilbratt Barrett with the consent of the vendors. The contract provided, "This land is sold upon express condition that the .- . . same
shall never be sold or rented to a colored person." Barrett, by separate
executory contract, sold the land to Wilson Robinson, a colored person.
The plaintiffs sought to assert a right of entry for breach of condition
1156 Rev. Stat. 1846,- c. 62, §34, c. 65, §4; Comp. Laws (1857) §§2618, 2723; Comp.
Laws (1871) §§4101, 4206; How. Stat. §§5550, 5654; Comp. Laws (1897) §§8816, 8958;
Comp. Laws (1915) §§11552, 11690; Comp. Laws (1929) §§12954, 13280; Mich. Stat.
Ann. §§26.34, 26.523; Comp. Laws (1948) §§554.34, 565.4.
1157 Note 138 supra.
,
1i;s 233 Mich. 373, 206 N.W. 532, 42 A.LR. 1267 (1925).
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by summary proceedings for possession against Barrett and Robinson.
A judgment for the defendants on procedural grounds was affirmed
on the ground the condition was void as an illegal restraint on alienation
of an estate in fee simple.
The opinion of the court, written by Justice Fellows, points out
that the statute Quia Emptores T errarum made free alienability an
inseparable incident of estates in fee simple and reaffirms the view of
Chancellor Kent and Justice Christiancy that Littleton's section 361
and the English and American cases based upon it, holding valid
limited restraints on alienation of a fee simple, are inconsistent in principle with the statute of Edward I. It having been ruled in Mandlebaum v. McDonell1 59 that a restraint general in scope but limited as
to duration is void for this reason, it follows, by parity of reasoning, that
a restraint limited as to alienees but unlimited in duration is equally
inconsistent with the principle laid down by the statute and likewise
void. After quoting Justice Christiancy's statement, "that a condition
or restriction which would suspend all power of alienation for a single
day, is inconsistent with the estate granted, unreasonable and void,"160
the opinion presses this argument to its sound and ultimate conclusion
in the following language:
"Now if a restraint on alienation for a single day is bad, how
can it be said that a restraint on alienation to a large class of citizens or a small one, or to even one is good? If it is not for the
courts to determine what would be a reasonable time to restrain
alienation, how can it be left to the courts to say whether a restraint on alienation to a class is reasonable or not? We must
bear in mind that we are not dealing with a restraint on the use
of the premises. Such restraints unless unreasonable have quite
uniformly been upheld. Before the sale of intoxicating liquor
was prohibited, this court and practically every court of last resort
in the Union upheld restraints of the use of premises for its manufacture or sale. Such a restraint upon the use was uniformly
upheld; but would a restraint on sale of premises to one who was
engaged in the sale of intoxicating liquors elsewhere be valid?
I think not. Restraints upon the erection of manufacturing plants
in residential districts have uniformly been upheld, but would
a restraint of sale to one engaged in the manufacturing business be valid? I think not. Restraint on the occupancy of premises in residential districts by colored people has been upheld by
159 Note
1e10 Note

138 supra.
140 supra.
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this court. Parmalee v. Morris, 218 Mich. 625.161 Does it follow
that a restraint upon the right to sell property to a colored man
is valid? I think not. I think the holding and the reasons for
the holding in Mandlebaum v. McDonell, supra, precludes us
from sustaining as valid the restrictions before us."162
At common law a conveyance in fee simple to two or more persons
created a joint tenancy unless it specified that they were to hold as
tenants in common.163 If one joint tenant died, the survivor or survivors took the whole and this right of survivorship could not be cut
off by .the will of the tenant so dying.164 If, however, one joint tenant
161188 N.W. 330 (1922). Michigan adhered to the rule that a restriction against
occupancy by members of a particular race is valid and specifically enforceable until overruled on constitutional grounds by the United States Supreme Court. In Schulte v. Starks,
238 Mich. 102, 213 N.W. 102 (1927) a provision, "that the granted premises shall not
be sold, rented or leased to any person or class of persons whose ownership or occupancy
would be injurious to the locality," was enforced by an injunction against occupancy by
colored persons. The opinion reiterates the rule in Porter v. Barrett that restraint on
alienation to members of a racial group is void as such. Northwest Civic Association v.
Sheldon, 317 Mich. 416, 27 N.W. (2d) 36 (1947); Mrsa v. Reynolds, 317 Mich. 632,
27 N.W. (2d) 40 (1947); Sipes v. McGhee, 316 Mich. 614, 25 N.W. (2d) 638 (1947),
reversed, McGhee v. Sipes, 334 U.S. 1, 68 S.Ct. 836 (1948); Malicke v. Milan, 320
Mich. 65, 30 N.W. (2d) 440 (1948), reversed in conformity to the decision in McGhee
v. Sipes, 320 Mich. 77, 32 N.W. (2d) 353 (1948). Cf. Kathan v. Stevenson, 307 Mich.
485, 12 N.W. (2d) 332 (1943); Kathan v. Williams, 309 Mich. 219, 15 N.W. (2d) 137
(1944); Gableman v. Dept. of Conservation, 309 Mich. 416, 15 N.W. (2d) 689 (1944);
Saari v. Silvers, 319 Mich. 591, 30 N.W. (2d) 286 (1948).
162 233 Mich. 373 at 382-383, 206 N.W. 532. The opinion in Porter v. Barrett treats
the condition against alienation as if it were annexed to a conveyance of a legal possessory
estate in fee simple whereas it actually was a provision of an executory land contract. It
was later decided in Sloman v. Cutler, 258 Mich. 372, 242 N.W. 735 (1932), that a
provision in an executory land contract against assignment without the consent of the vendor
is valid, at least for some purposes. Such a provision against assignment is, however,
inserted for the protection of the vendor's quasi-reversionary interest. The restraint in
Porter v. Barrett was intended to be inserted in the deed given pursuant to the contract,
for the benefit not of the vendor's interest but of other lands in the vicinity. Moreover,
there was no assignment in Porter v. Barrett.
Act 230, P.A. 1897, Comp. Laws (1897) §§7618 to 7638; Comp. Laws (1915)
§§10034 to 10056; Comp. Laws (1929) §§10304 to 10326; Mich. Stat. Ann. §§21.661 to
21.683; Comp. Laws (1948) §§455.1 to 455.24, authorizes the organization of corporations
to hold property for summer resort or park purposes, permits their by-laws to prohibit transfer of stock without the consent of the board of directors, and provides that lands "assigned,
allotted, or confirmed" to stockholders shall be deemed appurtenant to the stock and not
transferable separately. In In re Berry, (D.C. Mich. 1917) 247 F. 700, Judge Tuttle
expressed the view that this statute permitted such a corporation to convey land to stockholders in fee simple subject to a condition subsequent providing for forfeiture upon alienation separately from the stock or contrary to the rules of the corporation governing transfer
of stock. It seems improbable that the legislature intended to authorize such a fettered fee
simple. The language of the statute seems to contemplate that the corporation shall retain
the fee and give stockholders only leases or licenses.
163 Ll'lTLETON, TENURI!S §277 (1481).
164 Id., §287. See Butler and Baker's Case, 3 Co. Rep. 25a, 76 Eng. Rep. 684 (1591).
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made an inter vivos conveyance the joint tenancy was severed and the
transferee took an undivided interest as tenant in common which was
not subject to the right of survivorship and could, therefore, be transmitted by will.165 The Michigan statutes change the common law
presumption, so that a conveyance to two or more persons creates a
tenancy in common "unless expressly declared to be in joint tenancy,"
but provide that the nature and properties of estates in joint tenancy
and in common, "shall continue to be such as are now established by
law, except so far as the same may be modified by the provisions"
of the statutes.166

Smith 11. Smith161 involved a transaction in which J. N. Smith
conveyed land to a straw party who at once conveyed in fee simple
to J. N. Smith and D.R. Smith as joint tenants by a deed which provided, "It is a part of the consideration for which this deed is given
that neither of the parties of the second part hereto shall or can sell,
deed, mortgage, or in any way incumber or dispose of his interest in
said premises or any part thereof without the consent of the other party
in writing."
J. N. Smith, without the consent of his co-tenant, conveyed his
interest to the defendant, and later died. D. R. Smith claimed title
to the whole by survivorship, arguing that the prohibition on alienation
was valid because annexed to and for the benefit of another interest
in the same land. This argument assumed, of course, that the only
basis for the common law rule against restraints on alienation on estates in fee simple was the provision of the statute Quia Emptores
T errarum prohibiting reversions or remainders on such an estate. As
has been seen, the rule has two bases, the other being that the statute
makes alienability an inseparable incident of every estate in fee simple.
The court, recognizing the latter basis of the rule, held that the prohibition on alienation "was repugnant to the grant and a restraint on
185 Lnn.I!ToN, TllNUREs §§292, 294.
l86Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §§43, 44;

Comp. Laws (1857) §§26.27, 26.28; Comp.
Laws (1871) §§4110, 4111; Comp. Laws (1897) §§8825, 8826; How. Stat. §§5559, 5560;
Comp. Laws (1915) §§11561, 11562; Comp. Laws (1929) §§12963, 12964; Mich. Stat.
Ann. §§26.43, 26.44; Comp. Laws (1948) §§554.43, 554.44.
167 290 Mich. 143, 287 N.W. 411, 124 A.L.R. 215 (1939). The joint tenancy in
fee simple involved in this case must be distinguished from a joint tenancy for life with
contingent remainder in fee to the survivor. In the latter case one tenant cannot cut off
the remainder. Schultz v. Brohl, 116 Mich. 603, 74 N.W. 1012 (1898); Finch v. Haynes,
144 Mich. 352, 107 N.W. 910 (1906); Ames v. Cheyne, 290 Mich. 215, 287 N.W. 439
(1939).
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the inherent right of alienation and therefore void."168 Accordingly,
J. N. Smith's conveyance to the defendant gave her an undivided
half of the land as tenant in common in fee simple and her estate
was not cut off by the failure of J. N. Smith to survive his former
co-tenant. The court was careful to point out that, inasmuch as one
tenant by the entirety is disabled by law from alienating his interest
without the concurrence of his co-tenant,169 the decision does not extend to estates held by the entirety.
As to restraints on alienation of possessory estates in fee simple by
way of prohibition or penalty of forfeiture Michigan has achieved
that clarity and certainty which was the dream of the judges of the
thirteenth century. All such restraints, whether general in scope and
unlimited in duration or limited as to duration or alienees, are void.
The law as to the validity and specific enforceability of covenants or
contracts imposing like restraints has not been so fully worked out
but the decisions made point to the same result: all restraints on alienation of estates in fee simple are void. The fettered inheritances per~
mitted by the statute De Donis Conditionalibus have been eliminated
and the confusion in the law introduced by section 361 of Littleton's
treatise has been dispelled. To paraphrase Sir Edward Coke's nostalgic reference to the good old days before De Donis Conditionalibus,
we have attained a state of the law in which purchasers are sure of
their purchases, tenants of their leases and creditors of their debts.1 70

B.

Restraints on T estation and Intestate Descent

In the process by which the mediaeval judges limited the number
and fixed the incidents of the possible estates in land they developed_
rules of. descent for estates of inheritance.171 In the place of widely
varying modes of inheritance prescribed by custom or the form of gifts,
168 290 Mich. 157, 287 N.W. 416. Accord as to result: PROPERTY REsTA'O!Ml!NT
§406, comment c (1944). In Portage Grange No. 16 v. Portage Lodge No. 340, 141
Mich. 402, 104 N.W. 667 (1905), the grange leased a lodge room to the lodge for use
in common by them, the lease providing that the room should not be rented to any other
lodge without the consent of both lessor and lessee. The grange rented the room to another
society without the lodge's consent and sued the lodge in equity for an injunction against
interference with the new tenant's use of the room. A decree for the defendant was
affirmed, the court assuming without discussion that the restraint on alienation was valid.
The opinion does not state whether the grange owned a fee simple or some lesser estate.
See note 388 infra.
169 Naylor v. Minock, 96 Mich. 182, 55 N.W. 664 (1893); Dickey v. Converse, 117
Mich. 449, 76 N.W. 80 (1898). Accord: PROPERTY REsTA'I"l!MllNT §406, comment c
(1944).
170 I lNSTITtJT.BS 19b.
171. 3 HoLDSWORTH, HxsToRY oP ENGLISH LAw, 3d ed., 171-185 (1923).
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they strove to establish a uniform canon of descent, applicable to all
estates of inheritance. The statute De Donis Conditionalibus partially
thwarted this process of unification and simplification so far as entails
were concerned but it did not prevent the creation of a single rule of
inheritance applicable to every estate in fee simple.172 This rule of
inheritance became, like alienability inter vivas, an inseparable incident of the estate. Any attempt to deprive an estate in fee simple
of heritability or to endow it with a peculiar mode of descent not following the course fixed by the general law, is repugnant to the grant
and void.1 73 The commonest example of the application of this doctrine is the well-settled rule that if land is conveyed or devised in fee
simple, a gift over upon the death of the first taker if he fails to dispose
of the land by deed or will is void because it attempts to deprive an
estate in fee simple of the inseparable incident of heritability.174 The
Michigan statutes governing descent are so worded as to suggest that
they make heritability according to the statute an inseparable incident
of every estate in fee simple.175 Consequently, it may be predicted
that the Michigan courts will hold void any provision of a conveyance
or devise in fee simple which would operate to deprive the estate of its
incident of heritability or change the course of inheritance fixed by
law.
172 This statement must be qualified by an admission that a few peculiar local customs
of descent, such as gavelkind and borough English, did survive. Id. at 256-275. ScRU'ITON,
Lum IN FI!TI'l!RS 53-64 (1886).
173 "The law of England has from the earliest times prohibited the introduction of new
modes of devolution of property by operation of law. Of course a man can direct his property to go according to any series of limitations that he pleases, but he cannot create a new
mode of devolution by operation of law. If there be a gift in fee, for instance, the donor
cannot say that in the event of the donee dying intestate, the estate shall descend not to
his eldest, but to his youngest son .••• That is, a man cannot give property absolutely, and
at the same time say it shall not devolve according to law." Jessel, M. R., in In re Wilcocks' Settlement, [1875] 1 Ch. Div. 229 at 231. And see Johnson v. Whiton, 159 Mass.
424, 34 N.E. 542 (1893).
174 The cases are collected in GRAY, RllsTRAINTs ON Aul!NATION, 2d ed., 48-69 (1895)
and Schnebly, ''Restraints upon tl_ie Alienation of Legal Interests," 44 YALE L.J. 961, 1186
at 1198-1207 (1935). Professors Gray and Schnebly question the soundness of the rule
because it is not explicable by their theory that the law of restraints on alienation is based
wholly upon a public policy favoring free alienability of land. Accord with the rule: PROPERTY RllsTATBMBNT §27, comment f (1936), §406, comment g (1944). Annotation, 17
A.L.R. (2d) 7-227 (1951).
175 ''When any person shall die seized of any lands, tenements or hereditaments, or of
any right thereto, or entitled to any interest therein in fee simple • • . , not having lawfully
devised the same, they shall descend," etc. Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 67, §1; Comp. Laws (1857)
§2812; Comp. Laws (1871) §4309; How. Stat. §5772a; Comp. Laws (1897) §9064; Comp.
Laws (1915) §11795; Comp. Laws (1929) §13440; Mich. Stat. Ann. §27.3178 (150);
Comp. Laws (1948) §702.80.
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The statute Quia Emptores T errarum did not make transmissibility
by will an incident of the estate ip. fee simple and, as has been seen,
legal freehold estates in land were not devisable under the Plantagenets.176 It is probable that one of the reasons why the courts did
not enforce wills of land is that they would interfere with the uniform·
scheme of inheritance which the courts had annexed as an inseparable
incident to every estate in fee simple.
The Statute of Wills provided that any person having solely, as
co-parcener or in common, an estate in fee simple,
"from the twentieth day of July in the year of our Lord God
M.DJCL. shall have full and free liberty, power and authority to
give, dispose, will and devise, as well by his last will and testament
in writing, or otherwise by act or acts lawfully executed in his life,
all his said manors, lands, tenements or hereditaments, or any of
them, at his free will and pleasure; any law, statute or other thing
heretofore had, made or used to the contrary notwithstanding."177
The wording of the Statute of Wills indicates that it was intended
to make devisability an inseparable incident of every estate in fee
simple, just as the statute Quia Emptores T errarum made alienability
inter vivos an inseparable incident of every such estate, and it has been
so interpreted. A restraint on transmission of an estate in fee simple
by will is void if a like restraint on inter vivos alienation would be.178
The Michigan statutes provide, "Every person of full age and sound
mind being seized in his own right of any lands or of any right thereto,
or entitled to any interest therein descendable to his heirs, may devise
and dispose of the same by his last will and testament in writing...."179
Jones v. Jones1 80 was a suit to construe a will which devised the

testator's estate to his widow,
176 Note 8 supra.
177 Stat. 32 Hen. VIII,

c. 1, §1 (1540), as explained by Stat. 34 & 35 Hen. VIII, c. 5,
§§3, 4 (1542); see note 15 supra. Section 14 of the explanatory act provided that wills of
land made by married women should not be good or effectual.
178 GRAY, RESTRAINTS ON A.LmNATION, 2d ed., 43-48 (1895); Schnebly, "Restraints
upon the Alienation of Legal Interests," 44 YALE L.J. 961, 1186 at 1198-1199 (1935).
Accord: PROPERTY REsTATEMENT §406, comment f.
179 Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 68, §1; Comp. Laws (1857) §2825; Comp. Laws (1871)
§4322; amended Act 15, P.A. 1873; How. Stat. 5785; Comp. Laws (1897) §9262; Comp.
Laws (1915) §11817; Comp. Laws (1929) §13478; Mich. Stat. Ann §27.3178(71); Comp.
Laws (1948) §702.1. As originally enacted in 1846 the statute permitted married women
to make wills only with the consent of their husbands. This disability was removed by the
Constitution of 1850, and the Married Women's Act of 1855, note 152 supra. The earlier
Michigan statutes of wills were Act Jan. 31, 1809, 2 L. TERR. MxcH. 13; Rev. Stat. 1838,
p. 270.
180 25 Mich. 401 (1872).
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"to have, hold, use, and enjoy the same, as she may see fit, and in
all respects the same as though it was hers absolutely and without
any limitation or reversion, for and during her natural life. .
"And after the death of my said wife, it is my will, that my estate . . . that shall remain, should be distributed in manner following, to wit: [three quarters to named persons and a society];
and the remaining one-fourth of said estate I desire that my said
wife shall dispose of as she sees fit; the division, however, not to
take place until after her death.
·
"If my said wife shall desire to make sale of any of my said real
estate, in her use and enjoyment of it during her life, it is my will
and desire that she have, and I hereby give her, full power and
authority to make such sale, and to give all necessary deeds of conveyance thereof, and to receive the consideration therefor, to be
used as aforesaid by her during her life."
The court held that the intention expressed in the will was to
give the widow the entire estate in fee simple absolute and that the
second paragraph quoted above was merely a precatory expression of
what the testator hoped she would do with three quarters of the property when she was through with it. The court said, however, that if
the second quoted paragraph "should be considered as covering a gift
of what should remain, it would be void, as inconsistent with the absolute estate, or jus disponendi, previously given."181 If, as the court
thought, the testator intended to give his widow a fee simple, this dictum is correct, for the second quoted paragraph of the will would operate to deprive the estate of its inseparable incidents of heritability and
devisability and so be a void restraint on alienation. That is, a gift over
on failure of the first taker to alienate inter vivos is repugnant to a
grant or devise in fee simple.
The dictum in Jones 11. Jones has been misunderstood and has
served as the foundation for a line of cases holding or assuming that
there cannot be a remainder following a life estate if the life tenant
is given unlimited power of inter vivos disposition of the fee. 182 The
theory of these cases, based on authority in other jurisdictions, is that
a gift of a life estate plus an unlimited power of disposition inter vivos,
as a matter of law, and without regard to the intention expressed,
181 Id. at 404.
182 Glover v. Reid,

80 Mich. 228, 45 N.W. 91 (1890) (personalty; power held limited and so asswned rule of Jones v. Jones inapplicable); Jones v. Deming, 91 Mich. 481,
51 N.W. 1119 (1892) (realty; same as preceding); Gadd v. Stoner, 113 Mich. 689, 71
N.W. 1111 (1897) (realty; same as preceding); In re Mallory's Estate, 127 Mich. 119,
86 N.W. 541, 89 N.W. 348 (1901) (same as preceding); Dills v. La Tour, 136 Mich.
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operates to convey a common law estate in fee simple. If this premise
were sound in Michigan, the conclusion drawn by the cases would
be correct, i.e., that a gift over on failure of a tenant in fee simple to
alienate inter vivas is a void restraint on heritability and devisability.
In Michigan, however, the premise is not sound because our statutes
provide that when an unlimited power of disposition of the fee inter
vivas is given to a life tenant, "such estate shall be changed into a fee,
absolute in respect to the rights of creditors and purchasers, but subject to any future estates limited thereon, in case the power should not
be executed...."183 This statutory fee is not a common law fee simple and the gift over on failure of the life tenant to alienate inter vivas
is not repugnant to the statutory fee because the statute says that it is
not. This line of cases is, then, a correct exposition of the law of restraints on alienation of common law estates in fee simple but it reaches
a result contrary to the language of our statutes.

Robinson v. Finch184 was a suit to construe a will. One clause
devised the residue to Thomas Weldon; the next provided that if
Thomas should die leaving no wife and children, the property not
used by him or for his education or benefit should pass to named persons. Thomas died without wife or children. The court held that
the gift over was valid. The decision is probably sound and in accordance with the general rule in like cases inasmuch as the defeasibility
of Thomas's estate was not conditioned on his failure to alienate but on
243, 98 N.W. 1004 (1904) (realty; gift over held void on the basis of the assumed rule
of Jones v. Jones); Moran v. Moran, 143 Mich. 322, 106 N.W. 206 (1906) (same as preceding); Killefer v. Bassett, 146 Mich. 1, 109 N.W. 21 (1906) (same as preceding);
Turnbull v: Leavitt, 158 Mich. 545, 123 N.W. 43 (1909); Farlin v. Sanborn, 161 Mich.
615, 126 N.W. 634 (1910) (same as Jones v. Deming); Bateman v. Case, 170 Mich. 617,
136 N.W. 590 (1912) (same as preceding); White v. Grand Rapids & Indiana Ry. Co.,
190 Mich. 1, 155 N.W. 719 (1915) (same as Dills v. La Tour); Laberteaux v. Gale, 196
Mich. 150, 162 N.W. 968 (1917) (same as Jones v. Deming); Gibson v. Gibson, 213
Mich. 31, 181 N.W. 41 (1921) (same as Dills v. La Tour). In Quarton v. Barton, 249
Mich. 474, 229 N.W. 465 (1930) the court refused to apply the assumed rule in Jones v.
Jones to facts similar to those in Dills v. La Tour and Gibson v. Gibson. The opinion does
not, however, definitively ovenule the doctrine. Cf. Chamberlain v. Husel, 178 Mich. 1,
144 N.W. 549 (1913); In re East's Estate, 325 Mich. 352, 38 N.W. (2d) 889 (1949);
Thompson v. Thompson, 330 Mich. 1, 46 N.W. (2d) 437 (1951); Hollway v. Atherton,
205 Mich. 129, 171 N.W. 413 (1919).
188 Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 64, §§9, 13; Comp. Laws (1857) §§2666, 2670; Q)mp. Laws
(1871) §§4149, 4153; Comp. Laws (1897) §§8864, 8868; How. Stat. §§5598, 5602;
Comp. Laws (1915) §§11600, 11604; Comp. Laws (1929) §§13003, 13007; Mich. Stat.
Ann. §§26.99, 26.103; Comp. Laws (1948) §§556.9, 556.13.
184 116 Mich. 180, 74 N.W. 472 (1898).
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his death without wife or children, a common contingency upon which
to base an executory limitation. The mere fact that he had a limited
power of disposition free of the defeasibility of his estate in general
should not invalidate the executory limitation.185
There is dictum in Mandlebaum v. McDonell1 86 that "a man
cannot by contract render his will irrevocable during his life, for it is
of the very essence of a will to be revocable until death." Strictly
speaking, this statement is correct. Notwithstanding a contract against
revocation, a testator can revoke his will and the revoked will is no
longer eligible for probate.187 Nevertheless, the English courts have
long recognized the validity of a contract to transfer property by will.
Such a contract could be enforced by an action at law for breach
against the executor of the deceased promisor,1 88 or by a suit in equity
to compel the heir or devisee of the promisor to hold the property upon
constructive trust for the promisee or beneficiary of the promise.189
The Michigan decisions are to the same effect. If the owner of land,
for an adequate consideration, contracts to devise it to the other party
to the contract and does not do so, the promisee can compel the trans- feree, devisee or heir of the promisor to convey the land to him.190
And a contract to transmit property by will is enforceable by a beneficiary who is not a party to the contract.191 Contracts of the latter type
l85 See Schnebly, "Restraints upon the Alienation of Legal Interests," 44 YALE L.J.
961, 1186 (1935).
186 29 Mich. 78 at 91 (1874). See Mertens v. Mertens, 314 Mich. 651 at 658, 23
N.W. (2d) 114 (1946).
187 Hobson v. Blackburn, 1 Add. 274, 162 Eng. Rep. 96 (1822); Keasey v. Engles,
259 Mich. 178, 242 N.W. 878 (1932). See Eicholtz v. Grunewald, 313 Mich. 666 at 675676, 21 N.W. (2d) 914 (1946).
188 Silvester'1o Case, Poph. 148, 79 Eng. Rep. 1248 (1619).
180 Goilmere v. Battison, 1 Vern. 48, 23 Eng. Rep. 301 (1682); Fortescue v. Hennah,
19 Ves. Jr. 67, 34 Eng. Rep. 443 (1812); Cf. Lord Walpole v. Earl of Orford, 3 Ves. Jr.
402, 30 Eng. Rep. 1076 (1797); Cochran v. Graham, 19 Ves. Jr. 63, 34 Eng. Rep. 442
(1811).
190 Bird v. Pope, 73 Mich. 483, 41 N.W. 514 (1889); Jolls v. Burgess, 252 Mich.
437, 233 N.W. 372 (1930). See Paxton v. Faxon, 28 Mich. 159 (1873); Sword v. Keith,
31 Mich. 247 (1875); De Moss v. Robinson, 46 Mich. 62, 8 N.W. 712 (1881). There
are numerous later cases which assume the validity of contracts to make a will. In Mertens
v. Mertens, 314 Mich. 651, 23 N.W. (2d) 114 (1946), a provision in a divorce decree
requiring the husband to make a will and leave it unchanged was held improper in the
absence of a voluntary contract to do so. Such a provision is proper, however, if it confirms
a voluntary property settlement. Kull v. Losch, 328 Mich. 519, 44 N.W. (2d) 169 (1950).
t9t Carmichael v. Carmichael, 72 Mich. 76, 40 N.W. 173 (1888); Smith v. Thompson, 250 Mich. 302, 230 N.W. 156 (1930); Getchell v. Tinker, 291 Mich. 267, 289 N.W.
156 (1939). See Elmer v. Elmer, 271 Mich. 517, 260 N.W. 759 (1935). In such cases
however, the parties to the contract may rescind or modify it without the consent of the

MrcmGAN LAw REvmw

724

[ Vol. 50

usually are in the form of agreements not to revoke a joint or mutual
will. As has been seen, such a contract does not prevent the revocation
of the will but it does subject the devisee under a subsequent will to a
constructive trust for the benefit of the devisee under the joint or mutual will.1 92 Moreover, a contract by an owner of land not to convey
or devise it and to allow it to descend to his heirs is speci:6.cally enforceable by the heirs. 193
In form, a contract to make a will, not to revoke a will, or not to
make a will is a serious restraint on alienation of an estate in fee simple,
particularly when it is construed to restrain inter vivos alienation by the
promisor.194 Upon analysis, however, it is seen that such a contract
is not intended to and does not operate to restrain alienation by an
owner in fee simple. It is merely an executory land contract binding
the promisor to convey in the future by a particular mode of conveyance. An executory land contract operates to create an equitable estate, usually contingent or defeasible, in the purchaser. This type of
contract creates an equitable future interest in the beneficiary. The
promisor is not restrained from alienating his retained legal interest
but any transfer which he makes is subject to the equitable future interest of the contract beneficiary. The decisions relative to these contracts, therefore, do not qualify the general rule that restraints on the
heritability or devisability of estates in fee simple are void.

C.

Restraints on Partition and Division

At common law joint tenants and tenants in common, because each
had full power of inter vivos alienation of his interest, could partition their land by voluntary action. One joint tenant or tenant in
beneficiary. Sage v. Sage, 230 Mich. 477, 203 N.W. 90 (1925); Phelps v. Pipher, 320
Mich. 663, 31 N.W. (2d) 836 (1948); Rose v. Southern Michigan National Bank, 328
Mich. 639, 44 N.W. (2d) 192 (1950).
192Keasey v. Engles, 259 Mich. 178, 242 N.W. 878 (1932). See Eichholtz v.
Grunewald, 313 Mich. 666 at 675-676, 21 N.W. (2d) 914 (1946).
193 Ruch v. Ruch, 159 Mich. 231, 124 N.W. 52 (1909).
194 In Fortescue v. Hennah, note 189 supra,' the contract was construed as not inhibiting inter vivos alienation. In Carmichael v. Carmichael, note 191 supra, Bird v. Pope,
note 190 supra, Ruch v. Ruch, note 193 supra, Jolls v. Burgess, note 190 supra, and
Getchell v. Tinker, note 191 supra, the contracts' were construed to restrain inter vivos
transfer and enforced against the transferees. H the contract is construed as not inhibiting
inter vivos alienation the promiser is left with a life estate and an unlimited power of disposition inter vivos, which raises the problem involved in the cases cited in note 182 supra.
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common could not, however, compel partition.195 A statute of 1539
empowered such a tenant to do so, by action at law or suit in equity,
in language which would seem to be designed to annex the power to
such estates as an inseparable incident.196 Nevertheless, the English
courts appear to be willing to enforce at least some restraints on compulsory partition197 and the American courts are in conflict as to the
validity of such restraints.198 The Restatement of Property takes the
position that a restraint on voluntary partition is no more valid than
any other restraint on alienation of a fee simple but that a restraint upon
the power to compel partition is valid if limited in duration to a reasonable time.199 "Reasonable time" is defined as lives in being or twentyone years. 200 As Professor Gray has pointed out,201 a restraint upon
compulsory partition is not, strictly speaking, a restraint on alienation
because it does not deprive the owner of an interest of the power to
transfer what he has or penalize him for doing so. Yet it is a severe
indirect restraint on alienation and, if the statutes of partition are intended to make the power to compel partition an inseparable incident of every joint tenancy and tenancy in common, enforcement of restraints on that power is inconsistent in principle with the treatment of
restraints on alienation.
The Michigan statutes provide, "All persons holding lands as joint
tenants or tenants in common, may have partition thereof. . . ."202
The decision in Smith v. Smith203 that a restraint on the power of a
joint tenant in fee simple to sever the tenancy by conveying his interest is void would seem to indicate that no restraint could be imposed
in this state upon voluntary partition, by joint tenants or tenants in
195 l.rrn.ETON, TBNURBS §§290, 318 (1481). A parcener could compel partition.
Id., §241.
196 31 Hen. VIII, c. 1, §2 (1539).
197Peck v. Cardwell, 2 Beav. 137, 48 Eng. Rep. 1131 (1839). Cf. Abel v. Heathcote, 2 Ves. Jr. 98, 30 Eng. Rep. 542 (1793).
198 The cases are collected in GRAY, RBs'l"RAINTS ON ALmNATION, 2d ed., 24-25
(1895); Manning, "The Development of Restraints on Alienation Since Gray," 48 HARv.
L. RBv. 373 at 393-394 (1935); Schnebly, "Restraints upon the Alienation of Legal Interests," 44 YALB L.J. 961, 1186, 1380 at 1397-1403 (1935).
199 Sections 173 (1936), 412 (1944).
200 Section 173, comment c (1936).
201 GRAY, RBs'l"RAINTs ON ALmNAnoN, 2d ed., 25 (1895).
202 Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 109, §1; Comp. Laws (1857) §4616; Comp. Laws (1871)
§6266; How. Stat. §7850; Comp. Laws (1897) §11013; Comp. Laws (1915) §13258;
Comp. Laws (1929) §14995; Mich. Stat. Ann. §27.2012; Comp. Laws (1948) §631.1.
The earlier statutes were Act April 24, 1820, 1 L. TERR. MICH. 633; Act April 12, 1827,
2 id., 388; Rev. Stat. 1838, p. 481.
203290 Mich. 143, 287 N.W. 411 (1939), note 167 supra.
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common. If all of the co-tenants convey their interests in the entire
tract to a third person who conveys separate parts of the tract in severalty to each of them, partition would be accomplished even if there
could be a valid restraint on their releasing directly to each other. The
Michigan law as to restraints on the statutory power of one joint tenant
or tenant in common to compel his co-tenants to submit to partition
against their wishes is not so clear.
In Walton 11. T orrey2° 4 a provision in a will devising land to children that it should "remain undivided in the use, occupation and possession of all my children now living, until the youngest attains the
age of 21 years" was held not to prevent all of the devisees from conveying to a third party. There was no occasion for determining the
validity of the provision as a restraint on partition, voluntary or compulsory, but the decision demonstrates the ineffectiveness, if not the
invalidity, of a restraint on voluntary partition.
Avery v. Payne205 was a suit for pa:r;tition under the statute. The
defendant had conveyed an -undivided half of a large tract of land to
the plaintiff, the sole consideration' being a mortgage on the interest
conveyed securing a bond for payment to the defendant of $25,000
from the proceeds of sales of the land and a collateral contract by which
the plaintiff agreed to manage the subdivision and sale of the land.
The suit for partition was commenced some eight years after the execution of this conveyance and while much of the tract remained unsold.
The court denied partition on the ground that it would be inconsistent
with the contract, saying,

"We think the statute can only be considered imperative in its
application to ordinary joint tenancies or tenancies in common,
where the right of partition is left to result as an ordinary legal
incident of such tenancy; and that it was never intended to interfere with contracts between such tenants modifying or limiting
this otherwise incidental right; nor to render it incompetent for
parties to make such contracts, either at the time of the creation
of the tenancy or afterwards."206
Harr. Ch. 259 (Mich. circa 1836), note 135 supra.
12 Mich. 540 (1864).
206 Id. at 548-549. The opinion was written by Justice Christiancy ten years before
he wrote his great opinion in Mandlebaum v. McDonell, note 138 supra. See Swan v.
!spas, 325 Mich. 39 at 44-45, 37 N.W. (2d) 704 (1949).
204

205
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Eberts v. Fisher2° 1 was a suit to terminate a lease and compel partition brought by four of eleven devisees of the reversion against the
lessees, who had acquired the interests of the other seven devisees of
the reversion. The lease, made in 1860 by the devisor, who died in
1876, provided that it should run until 1880 and should be extended
automatically to 1890 unless the reversioners elected in 1880 to pay the
lessees for improvements made by them. The reversioners did not so
elect in 1880 but instead brought this suit, contending that the lease
was forfeited by breach of several conditions. The court held that
there had been no breach of the conditions of the lease and denied
partition, saying,
"As a general rule it is a matter of right for a tenant in common
of lands to have partition. But this rule is not of universal application. A party may enter into such agreements with his cotenant as to estop him from enforcing the right of partition. This
principle was recognized and applied in Avery 11. Paine 12 Mich.
540; and when in this case, instead of terminating the lease at
the end of twenty years, the complainants and defendants, by
mutual consent, obtained an appraisal of. the premises, it was in
effect an agreement that the premises should be held by the lessees
ten years longer under the terms of the lease; and in view of the
relation of the parties to the fee and reversion, it was as plainly
implied that such relations should not be interfered with by partition, without mutual consent, so long as the terms of the lease
were kept and performed by the lessees. Counsel for complainant
[sic] admit that unless the lease has been terminated by breach of
the conditions thereof, a partition is neither desirable nor asked
f or."208

Eberts

11.

Fisher is commonly cited in support of the proposition

that a restraint on compulsory partition of an estate in fee simple is
valid if limited in duration to a reasonable period. In view of the facts
that the plaintiffs did not ask for partition so long as the lease remained
in force and the lease was held to be in force, the language of the
opinion relative to the validity of restraints on partition is only dictum.
201

54 Mich. 294, 20 N.W. 80 (1884).

20s Id. at 299.
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In re Estate of Schilling209 was an appeal from a probate order
of distribution under. a will which devised land to four children of
the testatrix and the children of Caroline Moore, a fifth child, "Provided always, that none of my said real estate shall be sold or divided
between my said heirs before my youngest child is at the age of twentyone (21) years."
The order appealed from, entered when the youngest child of the
testatrix was some seventeen years of age, directed an immediate partition of the land between the devisees in severalty. The appellants
contended that the division should not be made until this child reached
twenty-one. The court affirmed the order of distribution, holding that
the quoted provision of the will was "void as repugnant to the nature
of the estate" so far as vested interests were concerned. As all interests
under the will vested upon the death of Caroline Moore, which occurred before the order complained of was entered, the restraint was
wholly ineffective when that order was made.
It would be unwise to assert that the four cases discussed make the
Michigan law as to restraints on partition definite and certain. The
decisions in Walton 11. Torrey and In re Estate of Schilling indicate
that a prohibition on partition in the instrument creating the co-tenancy
is void as repugnant to the estate created. As In re Estate of Schilling
relies upon Mandlebaum 11. McDonell, 210 it is probable that a provision
in the instrument creating a joint tenancy or tenancy in common imposing a forfeiture or other penalty on partition would likewise be
void as repugnant to the grant. Avery v. Payne and Eberts 11. Fisher
indicate, on the other hand, that a contract against partition made by
joint tenants or tenants in common with each other will be enforced
specifically by denial of compulsory partition, thus making such a contract effective as a prohibition on partition. There is nothing in the
last two cases to indicate whether Michigan will follow the qualification suggested by the Restatement that such restraints on partition
must be limited in duration to a reasonable period.
209 102 Mich. 612, 61 N.W. 62 (1894), note 154 supra. The partition in this case
was ordered by the probate court under Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 74, §5 [Comp. Laws (1857)
§2995; Comp. Laws (1871) §4499; How. Stat. §5967], relating to partition incident to
administration among heirs and devisees, rather than under the general statute authorizing
suits for partition in the circuit court, note 202 supra. There is no difference between the
statutes which would affect the problem under consideration. The current statute governing
partition by probate courts is the Probate Code (Act 288, P.A. 1939), c. 2, §98; Mich.
Stat. Ann. §27.3178 (168); Comp. Laws (1948) §702.98.
210 29 Mich. 78 (1874), note 138 supra.
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When knighthood was in flower a feudal overlord was more likely
to object to his tenant's alienating part of his land than to a transfer of all of it, since division of the holding compelled the overlord to
look to several tenants instead of one for performance of the services
due from the land. The Statute Quia Emptores T errarum empowered every tenant in fee simple "to sell at his own pleasure his lands
and tenements, or part of them" 211 and devoted one of its three chapters exclusively to regulating the division of services necessarily incident
to alienation of part of an estate.212 It seems perfectly clear that a provision in a conveyance of an estate in fee simple that the tract must be
kept intact and alienated, if at all, only as a whole, should be considered
void as attempting to deprive the estate of the inseparable incident of
alienability in part conferred on it by the statute.
Utujian v. Boldt2 18 was a suit to restrain resubdivision. The defendants had sold the plaintiff 2.8 acres according to an unrecorded
plat of a larger tract showing no lot smaller than an acre. Later the
defendants recorded a plat showing much smaller lots. The plaintiff
sought an injunction prohibiting the defendants from selling lots of
less than an acre in size. A decree for the plaintiff was reversed on the
ground that the plaintiff had not established the existence of a general
scheme or plan restricting the tract to large lots. The opinion suggests that such a restriction would be valid.
Bang v. Forman214 was a similar suit. The plaintiffs and defendants had purchased lots according to a recorded plat which showed
twenty-seven lots, each fifty feet wide and extending some five hundred feet from a beach to a road. The conveyance of each lot restricted its use to dwelling purposes and conferred on the owner a
211 18 Edw. I, stat. 1, c. 1 (1290).
212Jd., c. 2. The Plat Act of 1929 [P.A. 172, as amended; Comp. Laws (1929)
§§13198 to 13276; Mich. Stat. Ann. §§26.431 to 26.509; Comp. Laws (1948) §§560.1 to
560.79] prohibits, by penalty of $50 per lot sold, the partitioning or dividing of a lot, tract
or parcel of land into ten or more lots for the purpose of sale or occupancy for residential
purposes, other than by recorded plat, and authorizes a purchaser of a lot described by reference to an unrecorded plat to rescind his purchase. The act requires approval of plats
prior to recording by various public authorities and permits townships to regulate the width
of lots, provided that residence lots may not be required to be more than forty feet wide.
The act has no application to subdivision of agricultural land into lots of ten or more acres
for agricultural use. Nothing in the act appears to authorize private restrictions on resubdivision which are more onerous than those imposed by it.
21s 242 Mich. 331, 218 N.W. 692 (1928).
214 244 Mich. 571, 222 N.W. 96 (1928). Cf. Henkle v. Goldenson, 263 Mich. 140,
248 N.W. 574 (1933).
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right to use the beach in common with other lot owners. The defendants resubdivided three of these large lots into twenty-six small lots
and sold some of the small lots on on executory contract to purchasers
who erected cottages. A decree for the plaintiffs was affirmed in an
opinion which stresses the fact that the occupation of the three original lots by twenty-six families would overburden the easement of use
of the beach.

Wilcox v. Mueller 15 was also a suit to restrain resubdivision. A
subdivision containing lots of 3. 7 acres each was restricted throughout
to a single dwelling on each lot except that certain lots might be resubdivided so as to build not more than one house on each 17 5 feet of
frontage. The original subdivider and all the then lot owners signed
an agreement permitting the owners of four lots to subdivide these
four into 75 foot lots, with restrictions to one house on a lot. The
own~rs of these four lots did not take advantage of this agreement but
instead conveyed two of the lots to the original subdivider and two to
the defendants, who sought to resubdivide these two into 90 and 150
foot lots. A decree for the defendants was reversed, the court holding
that the agreement permitted resubdivision only of the whole four
lots to which it related, not of the two alone.
In the decision of these three cases the court failed to take account
of the distinction between use restrictions and restraints on alienation
set out in Porter v. Barrett. 216 A restriction against occupancy of a
given tract by more than one family or against erection of more than
one house on a parcel of land is valid under our law, though such restraints may tend to promote snobbishness, foster the growth of a
landed aristocracy and deter municipal development. A restraint on
alienation of part of a tract conveyed in fee simple is void under the
statute Quia Emptores T errarum. 216 a That the use restriction may have
the same practical result as the restraint on alienation is no answer to
the mandate of the statute, as the opipion in Porter v. Barrett clearly
points out. Insofar as Utujian v. Boldt, Bang v. Forman and Wilcox
v. Mueller hold that an owner in fee simple can be restrained from
alienating part of his land they are wrong in principle and ought to be
overruled.
I

215 250 Mich. 167, 229 N.W. 600 (1930).
216 233 Mich. 373, 206 N.W. 532 (1925), note 158 supra.
216aRe Lunham's Estate, I.R. 5 Eq. 170 (1871).
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D. Restraints in Form but not in Substance
As has been seen, even after it was settled that every restraint on
barring an entail by common recovery or statutory £ne was void, it was
possible to impose a valid penalty restraint on forms of alienation
by a tenant in tail which had a purely tortious operation, putting the
heirs in tail or the remainderman to the trouble of more difficult legal
procedures to assert their rights. 217 Likewise, a penalty restraint on
wrongful alienation of a fee simple, such as a tortious feoffment by a
husband seised in right of his wife, was valid at common law.218 In
both cases what was restrained was not really alienation but wrongful
attempts to alienate that which the alienor had no power to alienate,
attempts which could operate only to confuse and encumber the title.
The same principle is observable in the decisions relative to contracts
to devise by will, to leave a will unaltered, or to refrain from making a
will. In form such contracts are restraints on alienation; in substance
they are merely awkward methods of conveying future interests and
so not objectionable as restraints on alienation.
At common law, when property was conveyed to a public or
charitable corporation with a restriction, express or implied, to use for
the corporate purposes or some of them, the corporation was incapable
of alienating the property. 219 Michigan unquestionably recognizes the
validity of such restricted gifts. 220 Such a conveyance does not, strictly
211 1 CoKE, lNsTITUTEs 223b-224a and Butler's note No. 132 to 13th ed. (1787);
note 80 supra.
218 Anonymous, Y.B. 10 Hen. VII, Mich., pl. 28 (1494); note 108 supra.
219 In the cases of ecclesiastical corporations, colleges and hospitals this inalienability
was declared by statute, except that leases for three lives or twenty-one years reserving the
customary rent, could be made. 1 Eliz., c. 19 (1558); 13 Eliz., cc. 10, 20 (1571); 14
Eliz., c. 11 (1572); 18 Eliz., c. 11 (1575); 1 Jae. I, c. 3 (1603). As to other public and
charitable corporations, it was declared by judicial decision. Attorney-General v. Corporation of Plymouth, 9 Beav. 67, 50 Eng. Rep. 268 (1845). See Mayor and Commonal!)' of
Colchester v. Lowten, 1 V. & B. 226, 35 Eng. Rep. 89 (1813); Attorney-General v.
Warren, 2 Swans. 291, 36 Eng. Rep. 627 (1818); Attorney-General v. Pembroke Hall, 2
Sim. & St. 441, 57 Eng. Rep. 415 (1825); Bordwell, "Alienability and Perpetuities," 24
IowA L. REv. 1 at 12, 15 (1938).
220 Maynard v. Woodward, 36 Mich. 423 (1877); Hathaway v. Village of New
Baltimore, 48 Mich. 251, 12 N.W. 186 (1882); Penny v. Croul, 76 Mich. 471, 43 N.W.
649 (1889); FitzGerald v. City of Big Rapids, 123 Mich. 281, 82 N.W. 56 (1900);
German Corp. v. Negaunee German Aid Soc., 172 Mich. 650, 138 N.W. 343 (1912);
Hosmer v. City of Detroit, 175 Mich. 267, 141 N.W. 657 (1913); Greenman v. Phillips,
241 Mich. 464, 217 N.W. 1 (1928); Michigan Congregational Conference v. United
Church of Stanton, 330 Mich. 561, 48 N.W. (2d) 108 (1951). See Act 280, P.A. 1915;
Comp. Laws (1915) §§11099 to 11101; Comp. Laws (1929) §§13512 to 13514; Mich.
Stat. Ann. §§26.1191 to 26.1193; Comp. Laws (1948) §§554.351 to 554.353; Act 373,
P.A. 1925; Comp. Laws (1929) §§13516 to 13517; Mich. Stat. Ann. §§26.1201 to 26.1202;
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speaking, create a trust, but the result is much like a perpetual charitable trust.221 As any alienation of such property is wrongful, it would
seem that a provision in the conveyance to the corporation for forfeiture of the property on an attempt to alienate should be valid. 222
In County of Oakland 11. Mack223 the Michigan Supreme Court
treated as valid a provision in a conveyance of land to a county for the
purpose of erecting a court house, that, "if the above granted and
described lots of land or any or either of them be at any time used,
appropriated or sold otherwise than is herein expressed, limited and
declared~ then the same shall revert back to the said [grantor]."
So far as conditions subsequent, that is, provisions for forfeiture
to the creator of the estate or his heirs, are concerned the law has been
modified by a statute providing that,
"Whenever any lands shall heretofore or hereafter be conveyed
by any grant or devise to be held or used for any religious, educational, charitable, benevolent or public purpose, with a condition
annexed in the instrument of conveyance that in event said lands
shall at any time cease to be held or used for the purpose set forth
in such conveyance, title thereto shall revert to the grantor or devisor and his heirs, and . . . because of changed conditions or circumstances since the execution of such conveyance it is impossible
or impractical to longer hold or use said lands for the purposes
limited in such conveyance and that the religious, educational,
charitable, benevolent or public object of the grantor, as set forth·
in such conveyance, may be defeated thereby, a decree may be
entered authorizing the grantor [sic] to sell such lands ....
"No sale of lands under the decree of the court as herein provided shall defeat the estate of the grantee named in the original
Comp. Laws (1948) §§554.381 to 554.382; But see Kemp v. Sutton, 233 Mich. 249 at
260, 206 N.W. 366 (1925). There are numerous statutes regulating the powers of particular types of eleemosynary and ecclesiastical corporations to convey land, some of which
restate and others of which relax the general common law rule of inalienability, e.g. Act
327, P.A. 1931, §§152, 161, 174, 183, Comp. Laws (1948) §§450.152, 450.161, 450.174,
450.183; Act 80, P.A. 1855, §6, Comp. Laws (1948) §453.236; Act 235, P.A. 1849, §4,
Comp. Laws (1948) §457.234; Act 63, P.A. 1917, §5, Comp. Laws (1948) §457.265;
Act 29, P.A. 1901, §7, Comp. Laws (1948) §458.87; Act 42, P.A. 1842, §6, Comp. Laws
(1948) §458.156.
2213 ScolT, TRUSTS §348.1 (1939); Blackwell, ''The Charitable Corporation and
the Charitable Trust," 24 WAsH. Umv. L.Q. REv. 1-45 (1938). But see Detroit Osteopathic Hospital v. Johnson, 290 Mich. 283 at 296-297, 287 N.W. 466 (1939).
222 ST. GERMAIN, DoCTOR AND STUDENT, Dial. 2, c. 35 (ed. 1607). As to the authority of which see 5 HoLDSWORTH, HisTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 266-269 (1924).
223 243 Mich. 279, 220 N.W. 801 (1928).
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conveyance because of the failure to longer hold or use the same
for the purpose named in such conveyance and shall be sufficient to convey to the purchaser of such lands a good and sufficient
title in fee simple, free from all conditions or limitations whatsoever, under which the same shall theretofore have been held or
used."224
This statute makes a penalty restraint on alienation by way of
condition subsequent ineffective as against alienation pursuant to decree under the statute. By parity of reasoning with the cases holding
valid penalty restraints on tortious alienation by a tenant in tail even
where a restraint on the same tenant's levying a fine or suffering a recovery would be void, it would seem that the statute does not make
such conditions subsequent inoperative if the charitable or public corporation restrained attempts to convey without first securing a decree
under the statute. Moreover, the statute has no application to provisions for forfeiture to someone other than the original creator of the
estate or his heirs. It should be borne in mind, however, that unless
the gift over to another on alienation is to a charity, the provision for
it must be so worded as to take effect, if at all, within the period of the
Rule Against Perpetuities.2211
Another type of provision which restrains alienation in form but
not in fact is one for pre-emption. This may be a provision in a conveyance of a fee simple that the taker shall not sell the land without offering the donor or someone else an opportunity to buy or it may take
the form of a pre-emptive option contract by which the owner of the
land agrees not to sell without first giving the optionee an opportunity to
buy. The Restatement of Property takes the position that a pre-emptive provision is a restraint on alienation. 226 It asserts, nevertheless,
that such a provision is valid if the optionee is required to meet any
offer received by the optionor as a condition of exercising his option.
If, however, the optionee need pay only a fixed price or a percentage
of any offered price, the Restatement treats the provision as one governed by the general rules as to restraints on alienation of estates in fee
simple. 227 The latter rule, if applied strictly, would avoid all such
pre-emptive provisions in Michigan, inasmuch as our law does not
2 24Act 258, P.A. 1925; Comp. Laws (1929) §§13518 to 13521; Mich. Stat. Ann.
§§26.1211 to 26.1214; Comp. Laws (1948) §§554.401 to 554.404.
22 5 Scorr, TRUSTS §401.6 (1939); PROPERTY REsTATEMENT §397, comment a (1944).
226 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT §413 (1944).

227Ibid.
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admit the validity of limited restraints on alienation of a fee simple.
Probably the leading case adopting the Restatement's view that
a pre-emptive provision is a direct restraint on alienation is In re
Rosher,228 a nineteenth century English decision. That case involved
a devise of land in fee simple with a proviso that if the devisee should
wish to sell during the life of the testator's wife, she should have an option to purchase for a fixed price which, at the time of the decision, was
approximately a fifth of the value of the land. This proviso was held void
as a restraint on alienation inconsistent with the nature of an estate in fee
simple. The decisions in this country are far from uniform but there
appears to be some tendency to follow the rules laid down by the Restatement of Property. 229 As an option is essentially a future interest
in land which remains contingent until exercised it must not, in jurisdictions which follow that rule, exceed in duration the period of the
common law Rule Against Perpetuities, except when it is an option
reserved by the creator of the estate subject to it for his own benefit.230
Consequently pre-emptive provisions are frequently invalid because
they violate the Rule Against Perpetuities, even though they may not
offend the rule against restraints on alienation of estates in fee simple.

Windiate v. Lorman231 was a suit to remove a cloud from title. In
1910 the plaintiff executed an instrument providing,
228 [1884] 26 Ch. Div. 801.
22 9 The cases are collected in Schnebly, ''Restraints upon the Alienation of Legal
Interests," 44 YALE L.J. 961, 1186 at 1390-1395 (1935).
230 PROPERTY REsTATEMENT §§393, 394 (1944); GRAY, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3d ed., 308-310 (1915). There is dictum in Chief Justice Cooley's opinion in Smith
v. Barrie, 56 Mich. 314 at 317, 22 N.W. 816 (1885), in favor of the validity of a condition in a conveyance of an estate in fee simple that no sale of the property should be made
without first giving to the grantor, or his heirs, the opportunity to purchase. Such a condition does not violate the Rule Against Perpetuities but it does impose a potentially perpetual
indirect restraint on alienation.
231236 Mich. 531, 211 N.W. 62 (1926). The facts are more fully stated in the
companion case, Windiate v. Leland, 246 Mich. 659, 225 N.W. 620 (1929). The validity
of pre-emptive option contracts which required the optionee to meet any offer received by
the optionor was assumed in Hake v. Groff, 232 Mich. 233, 205 N.W. 145 (1925); NuWay Service Stations, Inc. v. Vandenberg Oil Co., 283 Mich. 551, 278 N.W. 683 (1938);
Digby v. Thorson, 319 Mich. 524, 30 N.W. (2d) 266 (1948); and Laevin v. St. Vincent
de Paul Society, 323 Mich. 607, 36 N.W. (2d) 163 (1949). Specific performance of such
a contract was granted in Brenner v. Duncan, 318 Mich. 1, 27 N.W. (2d) 320 (1947).
Cf. Harlow v. Lake Superior Iron Co., 36 Mich. 105 (1877). In Epstean v. Mintz, 226
Mich. 660, 198 N.W. 225 (1924), the defendant, owning land in fee simple, contracted
with the plaintiff, a real estate broker, to sell it when the plaintiff so advised and pay the
plaintiff a commission on the sale. It was held that the plaintiff was entitled to a commission upon the defendant's refusal to sell when so advised, the court saying that the contract
did not restrain alienation but encouraged it.
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"If I ever desire to sell, or if my heirs or devisees shall ever
desire to sell [certain lands], I will give to Janette Lorman, her
heirs, devisees and assigns the first opportunity to buy the said
land at the best price, not to exceed $1,000, which I can get for it
from anyone else ... and upon payment or tender of such price by
her, her heirs or assigns, to me, my heirs and devisees, that the land
shall be conveyed to her, her heirs or assigns, in fee simple...."
The plaintiff, at a time when the land was worth some $8,000, contended that this pre-emptive option was void and sought its removal as
a cloud upon his title. An assignee of the optionee intervened as party
defendant and filed a cross-bill for specific performance of the option.
The court affirmed a decree for the defendant granting specific performance of the option, saying that the common law Rule Against Perpetuities was not in force in Michigan so far as real property was concerned
and that the option did not offend a statute then in force which forbade suspension of the absolute power of alienation for a period in excess of two lives in being. In a later opinion involving the same option
the court intimated that the common law Rule Against Perpetuities has
no application to option contracts, citing as authority for that statement
section 339 of Gray's Rule Against Perpetuities and failing to note
that, when the following section of that work is read, it appears that
Professor Gray was of the opinion that specifically enforceable options
are governed by the Rule. The common law Rule Against Perpetuities
now applies to real property in Michigan. 232 Whether the court will
follow this doubtful dictum as to its inapplicability to options remains
to be seen.
Apart from the Rule Against Perpetuities problem, Windiate 11.
Lorman seems to establish in Michigan a rule, contrary to that of England and the Restatement of Property, that a pre-emptive option is never
a direct restraint on alienation and is not void under the law of restraints
on alienation even when the optionee is entitled to buy at a price
which is a small fraction of that offered by others. If the dictum as to
the inapplicability of the Rule Against Perpetuities is followed, such
an option may have the practical effect of restraining all alienation in
perpetuity. Michigan is probably logically correct in holding that a pre-

232 Act

38, P.A. 1949, §1; Mich. Stat. Ann. §26.49(1); Comp. Laws (1948) §554.51.
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emptive option is not a direct restraint on alienation but it is certainly
a very serious indirect restraint and it may be questioned whether such
restraints should be specifically enforceable in perpetuity.233

To be continued.
233 The use of a pre-emptive option for the sole purpose of restraining alienation is illustrated by Stoney Pointe Peninsula Assn. v. Broderick, 321 Mich. 124, 32 N.W. (2d) 363
(1948). There restrictions in a subdivision provided that if the subdivider did not approve
of a vendee to whom a lot owner proposed to sell, the subdivider might repurchase the lot for
the original sale price, without compensation for improvements. The circuit court held the
option void as a restraint on alienation. The Supreme Court denied specific performance
on another ground, without deciding whether the option was a restraint on alienation.

